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THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE AND EXTERNAL 
DEVELOPMENT: ADDRESSING PARK BOUNDARY-
AREA THREATS THROUGH PUBLIC NUISANCE 
John L. Giesser* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic dev.elopment projects outside of park boundaries pose 
a litany of threats to national parks throughout the country. 1 
New hotels, retail complexes, and amusement centers interfere 
with regional ecosystems by destroying natural habitats for plants 
and animals. 2 Modern buildings block out, or detract from, 
scenic vistas. 3 Increased commercial activity attracts people to 
park boundary areas, resulting in increased traffic, smog, litter, 
noise, and artificial light.4 Energy plants pollute the air create 
haze and acid rain, and contaminate soil and water. 5 All 
of these encroachments threaten citizens' enjoyment of national 
parks. 
The National Park Service (NPS) is responsible for managing and 
protecting national parks. 6 NPS relies on its regulatory authority to 
• Articles Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM c. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 80 (1983); NATIONAL 
PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, A RACE AGAINST TIME: FIVE THREATS ENDAN-
GERING AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THE SOLUTIONS TO AVERT THEM 4-25 (1991) 
[hereinafter RACE]. 
2 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 4-9, 23. RACE refers, for example, to a 10,000 unit resort and residential 
community planned for construction 50 feet from the border of Saguaro National Monument, 
Arizona. [d. at 8-9. Such a development would inevitably produce, among other things, 
increased traffic, car exhaust, noise, and light. 
6 EVERHART, supra note 1, at 75-79; RACE, supra note 1, at 4. 
6 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
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fulfill its responsibilities. 7 NPS's regulatory authority, however, 
probably does not extend beyond park boundaries. 8 
One option NPS has overlooked in protecting the national parks 
is the possibility of preventing the most intrusive adjacent devel-
opments through public nuisance actions. The federal government 
has the power to bring public nuisance actions to protect national 
parks. 9 Moreover, the government normally may bring such an action 
under federal common law. 10 Though the federal government, in a 
public nuisance action to protect a national park, would ordinarily 
bring the suit under federal common law, it may choose to sue under 
state law if necessary or preferable. 11 
For a variety of possible reasons, NPS has hesitated to bring 
public nuisance actions. Agencies, often hindered by bureaucratic 
inertia, tend to rely on regulatory authority and overlook possible 
common-law remedies. 12 In addition, NPS probably has misinter-
preted some public nuisance case law as having eliminated the 
chances of a successful suit. 13 Finally, recent Republican administra-
7 Telephone Interview with William J. Lockhart, Professor, University of Utah College of 
Law (Sept. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Lockhart Interview]. See infra notes 12-13 and accompany-
ing text. 
S See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 75; Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks 
and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239,241 (1976) [hereinafter Helpless 
Giants]. But see Brief from William J. Lockhart, Professor, University of Utah College of 
Law, on behalf of Florida Audubon Society 8-17 (Oct., 1991) (on file with William J. Lockhart) 
[hereinafter Lockhart Brief] (arguing regulations reach outside park boundaries). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 326 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Mark 
S. Squillace, Common Law Protection for Our National Parks, in OUR COMMON LANDS: 
DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 87,89-90 (David J. Simon ed., 1988). 
10 When the federal government seeks to protect an important federal interest, and no 
federal statute governs the issue, a court may apply federal common law. See ERIN CHEM-
ERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 296 (1989). Thus, as in United States v. County 
Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979), where the Federal District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia applied federal common law to the federal government's 
public nuisance action to protect a national park in Washington, D.C., courts will apply federal 
common law to federal government public nuisance actions filed to protect national parks. See 
id. at 139-40; see also Squillace, supra note 9, at 89. 
11 See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text. 
12 Lockhart Interview, supra note 7. Sax, explaining what he views as NPS's general 
reluctance to address external threats, attributes the hesitancy to NPS's belief that the 
Constitution might prevent its interference with private landowners. See Helpless Giants, 
supra note 8, at 241. 
13 Telephone Interview with Lars Hanslin, Attorney, National Park Service (Mar. 13, 1992). 
Hanslin believes, for example, that United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. 
SUpp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979), where the government lost a public nuisance action to prevent the 
completion of a high-rise development within view of a national park in Washington, D.C., 
demonstrated the futility of such lawsuits. Arlington County, however, does not foreclose the 
public nuisance option. See id. at 143-44; infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
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tions did not place environmental protection at the top of their 
domestic agenda. 
This Comment focuses on the threat to national parks from de-
velopment projects near park boundaries. It contends that NPS 
should use public nuisance actions to seek injunctions against these 
projects. Section II briefly describes the origin of national parks and 
the role of NPS. Section II then illustrates the environmental threats 
national parks face, referring in particUlar to the planned develop-
ment of a giant theater and retail complex next to an entrance to 
Utah's Zion National Park. Section II also analyzes NPS's authority 
to regulate external development. 
Section III of this Comment discusses general principles of public 
nuisance law. Section IV examines the elements of public nuisance 
law under both federal common law and Utah law. Section V dem-
onstrates that public nuisance actions would help NPS uphold its 
responsibility to preserve national parks. Finally, Section VI applies 
public nuisance law to the planned theater development at Zion 
National Park. 
Using the Zion theater as an example, Section VI demonstrates 
that NPS, using federal or state public nuisance law, could protect 
national parks from intrusive developments next to park boundaries. 
NPS could successfully seek an injunction by arguing that the Zion 
theater will unnecessarily detract from the level of environmental 
quality that Zion visitors legitimately expect. The Zion hypothetical 
lawsuit exemplifies the type of action that NPS might bring on behalf 
of parks throughout the country. 
II. NPS AND THE EXTERIOR DEVELOPMENT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL PARKS 
A. The Origin of National Parks and NPS 
In 1872, Congress passed legislation creating Yellowstone Na-
tional Park, the first national park. 14 Yellowstone consisted of two 
million acres, and its congressionally declared purpose was to pro-
vide the public with a park that every citizen could enjoy. 15 Congress, 
attempting to protect the Sierra mountain range and shield the giant 
sequoia trees from destructive logging methods, established Y osem-
14 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 8. 
15 See id. 
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ite, Sequoia, and Grant National Parks soon thereafter. 16 By 1916, 
early conservationists gained influence, and President Wilson signed 
legislation creating NPS.17 
By 1990, 358 national parks were welcoming over 250 million 
visitors annually.18 Visitors travel to parks for a variety of reasons. 
Some seek to escape from the pressures of urban life. 19 Some simply 
seek an opportunity to enjoy the natural environment. 2o Many visi-
tors take advantage of outdoor recreational options--such as hiking, 
camping, canoeing, and biking21-or the growing number of hotel 
and retail developments that exist within or near parks.22 Others 
enjoy the historical, cultural, and archaeological treasures located 
within some parks.23 Unfortunately, both growing numbers of visi-
tors and increasing development occurring within and outside of park 
boundaries are threatening the environmental quality of national 
parks.24 This Comment focuses on exterior threats. 
The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 (Park Act) created 
NPS.25 The Act broadly authorizes NPS to promote and to manage 
national parks.26 NPS's purpose is to conserve park scenery and 
historic objects, protect the parks' natural environment, and facili-
tate public visitation in a manner consistent with conservation 
goals.27 Presently, each national park is headed by a superintendent, 
and park staffs include biologists, architects, engineers, fiscal ana-
lysts, maintenance personnel, and rangers, all of whom work to-
gether to protect park environments, maintain NPS's facilities, ed-
ucate visitors, and uphold the law.28 Overall management of NPS 
comprises three tiers.29 The central headquarters, situated in Wash-
ington D.C. and headed by the Director of NPS, develops NPS's 
16 See id. at 10. 
17Id. at 13-16. 
18 RACE, supra note 1, at 24. 
19 See JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 652 (1961). 
20 See JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL 
PARKS 46 (1980). 
21 See RACE, supra note 1, at 22; Ted Williams, Zion: The Movie, AUDUBON, Nov.-Dec. 
1991, at 14, 18-21. 
22 See SAX, supra note 20, at 12. 
23 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 11. 
24 See RACE, supra note 1, at 4-13, 21-23. 
25 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 33, 39. 
29 Id. at 33. 
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policy and oversees regional field offices, which in turn monitor 
individual parks. 30 
B. Threats to National Parks 
Commercial and industrial development threatens national parks 
with a variety of environmental harms. 31 The quality of air, water, 
vegetation, and aesthetics in the parks is deteriorating. 32 As a result, 
plant and wildlife habitats are in danger, cultural and historic land-
marks are suffering damage,33 and visitors are unable to enjoy the 
pristine environment and tranquility that many seek. According to 
a 1980 report by NPS, development outside of park boundaries poses 
the greatest threat to park environments. 34 
Development of condominiums, hotels, and retail complexes next 
to park boundaries has a detrimental effect on parks.35 Buildings 
block scenic vistas. 36 Increased water usage drains water tables and 
damages water quality.37 Developments attract increased popula-
tions to boundary areas, add to traffic congestion, and, consequently, 
increase noise and air pollution levels. 38 Additional people create 
litter. Furthermore, commercial businesses introduce pesticides into 
park ecosystems. 39 
People generate pollution outside of parks in a variety of ways 
that threaten the environment of parks. Smog from large cities, 
discharge from power plants, and emissions from automobiles com-
bine to produce dirty air, acid rain, and haze in parks throughout 
the United States. 40 The dirty air and rain harm aquatic and vege-
tative life within the parks.41 Haze detracts from scenic views in 
parks in all forty-eight lower states for ninety-percent of each year. 42 
30 I d. at 33--35. 
31 See RACE, supra note 1, at 4-25. 
32 See id. at 4, 12; EVERHART, supra note 1, at 75. 
33 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7-12. 
34 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 80. 
35 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7. 
36 See id. at 8 (refers to Shenandoah National Park, Virginia, where construction projects 
have blocked beautiful vistas, and the percentage of park boundary land that is developed has 
increased from 10% to 38% over the past 10 years). 
37 See id. at 7. 
38 See id. at 7, 23; Williams, supra note 21, at 16. 
39 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7. 
40 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 75-79; RACE, supra note 1, at 4. 
41 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 79; RACE, supra note 1, at 4. 
42 RACE, supra note 1, at 4. 
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By disrupting park ecosystems, pollution also impairs opportunities 
for scientific study of natural environments.43 
Other types of large-scale projects intended to satisfy the needs 
of modern society also threaten park environments.44 At Great 
Smoky Mountains National Park in North Carolina, for example, 
environmentalists are fighting to stop a municipal landfill located 
adjacent to a park entrance and near an important black bear habi-
tat. 45 Environmentalists warn that the landfill will attract bears, and 
that humans and bears will clash.46 At Everglades National Park in 
Florida, the construction of canals and the alteration of natural water 
flows has resulted in extensive damage to the park's complex eco-
system. 47 
Finally, development and pollution have a negative effect on the 
more intangible aesthetic assets of parks.48 New buildings and haze 
obstruct scenic views, pollutants degrade the quality of the air and 
water that park visitors breath and drink, and crowds of people and 
traffic generate increased levels of noise and commotion. As a result, 
visitors are less able to find a serene setting in which to reflect, 
relax, escape, and enjoy nature. 49 
Many development projects that harm the environment also ben-
efit the public in certain ways. New roads and housing near parks 
increase access to parks. 50 Development projects can create profits 
for the business community, revenues for towns, and jobs.51 More-
over, many park visitors enjoy the luxuries new lodging facilities, 
restaurants, and shops offer. 52 Finally, energy plants that create 
smog, and dams that harm aquatic ecosystems, produce energy for 
a society that demands large quantities of energy. As for the needs 
of wilderness lovers, developers might argue that such people can 
travel into a park's interior to avoid the negative aspects of boundary 
development. 53 
43 See ISE, supra note 19, at 652. 
44 See RACE, supra note 1, at 8, 12. 
45 [d. at 8. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 12. The report exemplifies the problem by noting that "[s]ince the 1930's the 
Everglades' population of nesting wading birds has decreased by 95%, from more than a half-
million to 15,000 or fewer." [d. 
48 See ISE, supra note 19, at 652. 
49 See id. at 652-54; SAX, supra note 20, at 46. 
50 See ISE, supra note 19, at 652; EVERHART, supra note 1, at 80. 
51 See Williams, supra note 21, at 18. 
52 See SAX, supra note 20, at 61. 
53 See ISE, supra note 19, at 656. 
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Many environmentalists, however, argue that the proper purpose 
of the national parks is to provide a pure environment in which 
nature can thrive and visitors can experience a world uncontami-
nated by man. 54 These environmentalists believe that if development 
is necessary to provide modern luxuries and recreation options for 
those visitors less interested in a natural environment, the devel-
opment should not occur immediately outside of park boundaries. 55 
The remaining amount of pure wilderness, unlike the growing blocks 
of commercial development, is too small and deserves protection. 56 
C. Zion National Park: Portrait of a National Park Facing 
External Threats 
1. Background on Zion 
National park historian John Ise considers Zion National Park, 
located in southwestern Utah, to be one of America's most beautiful 
national parks. 57 Ise compares Zion, with its tall red canyon walls 
that reach up from both sides of the Virgin River, to Yosemite 
National Park. 58 Explorers of European descent first arrived at Zion 
in 1858, and Zion officially gained national park status in 1919.59 
Congress increased Zion's acreage in 1937 and 1956.60 
In the 1920's, following Congress's authorization of funds for the 
building of trails, roads, and railroads through Zion, citizens began 
touring the park in growing numbers.61 Today Zion is the most 
popular of Utah's five national parks,62 receiving 2.7 million visitors 
in 1992 alone, with increased numbers expected in the years ahead. 63 
Visitors arrive to hike the park's canyons and trails, to take tours 
64 See id. at 654-57. 
55 See generally Robert Reinhold, Aisle Seats to a National Park? Well, Maybe, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991, at 9. "The preservationist," according to Sax, " ... believes that 
opportunities for conventional tourism are amply provided elsewhere: at resorts and amuse-
ment parks . . . and on a very considerable portion of the public domain too." SAX, supra 
note 20, at 14. 
56 See ISE, supra note 19, at 655. 
57 See id. at 241. Over the years, explorers have been "awestruck" by Zion's beauty. See 
Brian C. Mooney, Dazzled by the Color Country, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1992, at BU. 
58 See ISE, supra note 19, at 241-43. 
59Id. at 241-42. 
60 Id. at 243 
61Id. 
62 Utah Town OKs Controversial Theater Near Zion National Park, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 
1991, at C12. 
63 Telephone Interview with Larry Wiese, Assistant Park Superintendent, Zion National 
Park (Mar. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Wiese Interview IV]. 
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on roads or railroads, and to camp at Watchman and South camp-
grounds. 64 
Watchman Campground is located on the eastern bank of the 
Virgin River, across the river from the town boundary of Springdale, 
and adjacent to the park's south entrance. 65 Campers are free to 
pitch tents and to enjoy the natural surroundings of the river, mead-
ows, trees, and wildlife. 66 The horizon includes beautiful foothills and 
mountains that glow as the sun rises and sets. The campground is 
well known for treating campers to spectacular nighttime views of 
starlit skies. 67 
2. The Threat: World Odyssey's Giant Theater Development 
Commercial developer World Odyssey, Inc., (Odyssey) has se-
lected a site directly across the Virgin river from Watchman Camp-
ground, and adjacent to the south entrance to Zion, for the construc-
tion of a seven story movie theater (Theater) which will house a 
giant wraparound movie screen. 68 The park's south entrance, the 
gateway for the majority of all visitors to Zion, welcomed 2.7 million 
visitors in 1992.69 The development will include five-thousand square 
feet of retail shops and a parking lot for 169 cars.70 The Theater, 
modeled after similar theaters near other national parks, will show 
a film about Zion. The building will be visible from the rQad leading 
into the park. 71 
The development would have been even larger had Odyssey not 
responded to the concerns of NPS and local environmentalists by 
agreeing informally72 to modify its original construction blueprints. 73 
64 Id.; see Williams, supra note 21, at 20-21. 
65 See RACE, supra note I, at 7; Williams, supra note 21, at 19-20; Briefing Statement from 
National Park Service, Zion National Park 1 (Feb. 1991) (on file with the National Park 
Service) [hereinafter Briefing StatementJ. 
66 See Williams, supra note 21, at 19-20. 
67 Telephone Interview with Larry Wiese, Assistant Park Superintendent, Zion National 
Park (Oct. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Wiese Interview IJ. 
68 Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1. 
69 Wiese Interview IV, supra note 63. 
70 See Williams, supra note 21, at 16; Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1. 
71 Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
72 Telephone Interview with Larry Wiese, Assistant Park Superintendent, Zion National 
Park (Jan. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Wiese Interview IIJ. Odyssey has not formally committed to 
a modified plan. Id. Wiese, however, believes that Odyssey has made a good faith effort to 
cooperate with NPS officials who are concerned with the Theater's impact on park visitors. 
Telephone Interview with Larry Wiese, Assistant Park Superintendent, Zion National Park 
(Feb. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Wiese Interview III]. 
73 See Williams, supra note 21, at 16; Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1. 
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Thus, current plans, as described above, reflect Odyssey's agree-
ment to scale back the size of the retail area from twelve-thousand 
square feet, reduce the number of parking spots from the original 
goal of 275, and abandon plans for an eighty-room motel complex 
that would have included a spa, a pool, gift shops, a lounge, and a 
restaurant. 74 Moreover, Odyssey has agreed informally to use a re-
duced level of outdoor lighting, 75 to operate the Theater only during 
the day,76 to create a construction design that blends in with the 
park,77 to preserve some meadow that Odyssey had targeted for 
development, to provide a nature trail,78 and to help minimize po-
tential traffic congestion. 79 Odyssey's revised architectural plan, 
placing the development behind a hill, reduces the projects's visibil-
ity from the road. 80 Finally, Odyssey and Theater proponents con-
tend that the Theater will divert visitors from actually entering the 
park, thus relieving pressure on the park. 81 
Nonetheless, while Odyssey has pledged to make modifications 
and to adopt plans that address some of the opponents' concerns, 
the opponents still maintain that the movie theater and retail com-
plex will cause significant environmental damage and detract from 
the experience of campers and visitors.82 These opponents-consist-
ing of park administrators, park enthusiasts, and environmental-
ists-also point out that Odyssey's pledges are only informal and 
that the developer is not legally bound.83 Moreover, even with the 
modifications, the Theater still will obstruct the view from Watch-
man Campground, and it probably will create increased traffic, noise, 
litter, air pollution, and light, and detract from the overall experience 
visitors seek. 84 
Opponents are concerned primarily with the location of the devel-
opment.85 The complex will be directly adjacent to the park's en-
7. See Williams, supra note 21, at 15-16; Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1. 
76 Wiese Interview II, supra note 72. 
76 [d. 
77 Williams, supra note 21, at 15-16; Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
78 See Williams, supra note 21, at 16. 
79 Wiese Interview III, supra note 72. 
80 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
81 See Williams, supra note 21, at 15. 
82 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Williams, supra note 21, at 16-20. 
83 See Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1; Wiese Interview II, supra note 72. 
84 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Williams, supra note 21, at 16; Wiese Interview II, 
supra note 72. 
85 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7; Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Briefing Statement, supra 
note 65, at 1. 
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trance and the popular Watchman Campground. 86 Situated as 
planned, the complex will partially obstruct the view visitors have 
as they approach and depart from the south entrance of the camp-
ground. 87 Campers, while staying at Watchman, will have an unnat-
ural addition to their surroundings.88 Opponents appear to believe 
that by developing the Theater further from the campground and 
entrance, Odyssey would cause significantly less harm to the park 
environment.89 Thus, opponents have urged Odyssey to consider 
available alternative sites.90 NPS, for example, while not opposed to 
the development per se, objects to the development's location. 91 One 
site that opponents prefer, and that is apparently available, is located 
approximately one mile from the current site, far from the main 
road. 92 
Odyssey has resisted pressure to change the location of the de-
velopment. 93 Developers, pointing to their efforts to scale back plans, 
insist that the theater complex will not be as objectionable as its 
opponents fear. 94 Furthermore, Odyssey argues that private land-
owners have the right to maximize the profitability of their prop-
erty.95 
Developers and supporters of the project point to the benefits the 
development will offer to the local community and to some park 
86 RACE, supra note 1, at 7. 
87 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
88 See Theater to Be Built Adjacent to Utah Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1991, at A14 
[hereinafter Theater]. Ted Williams describes Watchman Campground: 
[I]t is breathtaking and spectacular. My eyes pan the chartreuse band of cottonwoods, 
box elders, and bigtooth maples along the flood plain then swing up to sage and 
pinyon pine on the desert foothills, up farther to cedar-flecked talus slides, and finally 
to sandstone peaks and arches beyond which, like the halls of Olympus, stands an 
unseen subalpine forest of Douglas fir and Ponderosa pine--dwelling place of deer 
and mountain lions. 
Williams, supra note 21, at 20; see also Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
89 See Theater, supra note 88, at A14; Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Briefing Statement, 
supra note 65, at 1. 
90 Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Find New Zion Theater Site, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 6, 
1991, at AID. A Salt Lake Tribune editorial stated that "[g]iven the large amounts of unde-
veloped land in the vicinity, it seems the developer, the city, the park service and interested 
outsiders could find a compromise other than the presently proposed site which would be in 
everyone's best interest." Id. 
91 Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1. Reinhold's article quotes Larry Wiese, Assistant 
Superintendent of Zion, prior to Odyssey's agreement to modify its plans. Said Wiese of the 
Theater, "[t]he aesthetics at the entrance of the park would be changed dramatically. The size 
of the project just overwhelms that site." Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
92 Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
93 See id. at 9 (agreement to scale back project, but not relocate); Briefing Statement, supra 
note 65, at 1. 
94 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Williams, supra note 21, at 16. 
95 Telephone Interview with David Mariani, Chairman, World Odyssey, Inc. (Feb. 26, 1993). 
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visitors.96 The Mayor of Springdale, local business leaders, and sev-
eral members of the Springdale town council laud the economic 
effects that the increased business will have on Springdale. 97 Al-
though it has asked Odyssey to consider alternative locations, the 
Planning and Zoning Commission has agreed to waive certain ordi-
nances that normally would prohibit the development. 98 In addition, 
the producer of Odyssey's film claims that the Theater and its wra-
paround screen will afford many viewers who would not enter the 
park a chance to view an impressive film about the park. 99 The Mayor 
adds that the land upon which the complex will be built is merely 
an ordinary meadow, and thus is not particularly attractive in its 
current state. 100 
The Springdale Planning and Zoning Commission has granted Od-
yssey final approval of the Theater development, and construction 
crews have already broken ground. 101 Workers, however, will not 
proceed with construction until springtime. 102 NPS, while opposed 
to the present location, has not taken legal action to prevent the 
development or to force a change of location.103 The National Parks 
and Conservation Association (NPCA), on the other hand, unsuc-
cessfully attempted to challenge the legality of the development. 
NPCA argued that because the development's height would exceed 
thirty-five feet, the Springdale Town Council's approval of the de-
velopment violated the Springdale Zoning Ordinance and under-
mined Springdale's Master Plan. 104 
D. NPS's Power to Regulate External Development 
NPS's regulatory jurisdiction probably does not extend beyond 
park boundaries. 105 Although some might argue that NPS has the 
96 See Williams, supra note 21, at 15-2l. 
97 See id. at 15-18. The Mayor is quoted as saying "the more business you have here the 
better it is for everybody." [d. at 18. 
98 Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at 1; Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
99 See Williams, supra note 21, at 21 (Mayor claimed that 80% of park visitors don't hike 
canyons). 
100 See id. at 18. 
101 Wiese Interview III, supra note 72. 
102 [d. Park officials expect construction to proceed at full speed once the warmer months 
of 1993 arrive. [d. 
103 See Briefing Statement, supra note 65, at l. 
104 See Memorandum from Becky Parr, Attorney, National Parks and Conservation Asso-
ciation (June 24, 1991) [hereinafter NPCA Memo]. 
105 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 75 ("[n]ational park legislation restricts the jurisdiction 
of the Park Service to the lands inside the park boundaries ... [p]rotection ends at the park 
boundary"); Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 241, 243-44. But see Lockhart, supra note 8, 
at 8-17 (arguing regulations may reach outside park boundaries). 
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statutory power to regulate against external threats,106 NPS would 
not share their view.107 NPS is reluctant to act against private land-
owners absent eminent domain proceedings. 108 In spite of its inability 
to regulate against external encroachments, NPS has not aggres-
sively used its ability to bring common-law nuisance or trespass 
actions. 109 
III. PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND 
STATE LAW 
A. Application of Federal Common-Law Public Nuisance 
Although the United States Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins,l1O severely limited the development of federal common 
law,111 federal courts, out of necessity, still apply federal common 
law in certain limited circumstances. 112 Where no federal statutory 
rules govern,113 federal courts may apply federal common law to 
disputes between states, and to cases involving important federal 
interests. 114 Courts have consequently applied federal common law 
of public nuisance to certain actions that fit the above exceptions to 
Erie. 115 
Federal common-law public nuisance governs public nuisance ac-
tions between states where no comprehensive federal regulatory 
106 See, e.g., Lockhart, supra note 8, at 8-17. 
107 See Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 242-43 (describing NPS' belief that it does not 
have Congressional authority to regulate private landowners outside of parks). Sax states 
that "[oJnly once did Congress give the Park Service explicit authority to regulate outside 
lands: this was a short-lived effort to control activity on Indian Reservation lands near Mesa 
Verde National Park. ... " [d. at 244. 
108 See id. at 243. 
109 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
110 304 U. S. 64 (1938). 
III See id. at 78. 
112 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 295. 
113 See id. at 295, 310-11. 
114 See id. at 296. For an example of a court hearing a case involving an important federal 
interest under federal common law, see United States v. County Ed. of Arlington County, 
487 F. Supp. 137, 139-40 (E.D. Va. 1979). In Arlington County, the federal government 
brought a public nuisance action to protect U.S. property. See id. at 140. On the other hand, 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981), is an example of a 
case where the United States Supreme Court did not apply federal common law to a dispute 
between states because the Clean Water Act governed the controversy. 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 326 (E.D. Tex. 1988) 
(application of federal common law of public nuisance to federal government's action to prevent 
defendants from demonstrating in a way that would damage national park); Squillace, supra 
note 9, at 89, and cases cited therein. 
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scheme governs. U6 Thus, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,117 the 
Court applied federal common law to the state of Illinois' public 
nuisance action against the city of Milwaukee. u8 In this case, Illinois 
sued Milwaukee for polluting Lake Michigan's interstate waters, and 
the Court relied on federal common-law public nuisance because the 
related federal statute, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA), preserved states' rights to bring common-law actions 
seeking pollution abatement. u9 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and 
Mich.,120 however, the Court reexamined the dispute following the 
enactment of the 1977 amendments to FWPCA.121 The Court held 
that federal regulations preempted federal common law and gov-
erned the dispute between Milwaukee and Illinois because the new 
FWPCA comprehensively regulated interstate water pollution. 122 
As with certain interstate suits, federal common-law public nuis-
ance applies where the federal government brings public nuisance 
actions to protect important federal interests. 123 Thus, federal com-
mon-law public nuisance applies to federal actions to protect federal 
lands. 124 In United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County,125 for 
example, the Supreme Court applied federal common law to the 
federal government's public nuisance action to protect the Capital's 
national park. 126 The government sought an injunction against de-
velopers of a Virginia highrise development that threatened to de-
grade the beauty of the park. 127 
116 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 295, 310-11; City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and 
Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981). 
117 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
118 [d. at 107. 
119 See id. at 104. 
120 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
121 [d. at 316-17. The Clean Water Act is the common name for the 1977 amendments to 
FWPCA. 
122 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981); see also United 
States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. N.J. 1982) (where United States sued 
defendant landfill owners and operators for polluting air, court held that Clean Air Act 
preempted federal common law by comprehensively regulating corporate activities that pollute 
air). 
123 See, e.g., United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp 137, 139-40 
(E.D. Va. 1979) (application of federal common law to public nuisance action to protect federal 
land-an important federal interest); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 296. 
124 See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 139-40; Squillace, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
126 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
126 See id. at 139-40. 
127 Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 139-40; see also United States v. Rainbow Family, 
695 F. Supp. 314, 326, 329 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (court applied federal common-law public nuisance 
to federal government's action seeking injunction to prevent protesters from damaging national 
park in Washington, D.C.). 
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B. Application of State Public Nuisance Law 
Although federal common-law public nuisance is sometimes appli-
cable, a plaintiff might also bring a public nuisance action under state 
law. 128 Thus, although the federal common law often applies to fed-
eral public nuisance actions, the federal government might choose 
to bring an action under state public nuisance law. State public 
nuisance law, however, might not apply to an action when a state 
law conflicts with a federal statute. 129 In International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette,130 where Vermont landowners sued the International Pa-
per Company, a New York corporation, for polluting Lake Cham-
plain in Vermont, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) did not preempt New York public nuisance law. 131 The Ouel-
lette court reasoned that New York's nuisance law would not conflict 
with the CWA because the CWA empowered source states like New 
York to impose higher standards on their own polluters. 132 
C. Standing 
Public officials, such as attorneys general, whose offices vest in 
them the authority to represent the state, nation, or a government 
agency, may bring public nuisance actions. 133 In addition, courts 
may grant standing in a public nuisance action to an individual 
plaintiff in a class action, as well as to a private plaintiff who is 
among those citizens injured by the defendant's conduct, and who 
has suffered a more severe injury than the others.134 Ordinarily, a 
government official will bring a public nuisance action. 135 
The United States government, for example, has standing to bring 
a public nuisance action where the complaint involves an important 
federal interest. 136 Thus, the United States would have standing to 
128 See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498 (1987). 
129 See id. at 494-97. 
130 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
131 [d. at 497. 
132 [d. at 496--500. The court also held that Vermont nuisance law did not apply because 
applying the law of a non-source state, where the state had no input in regulating the polluter 
pursuant to CWA, would interfere with the CWA. [d. at 497. 
133 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1965). 
134 See id. 
135 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 123 (1992). 
136 See United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 326 (E.D. Tex. 1988). The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held 
[w]here necessary to protect its proprietary interests in public lands, or where there 
is some other genuine interest to protect or defend, such as preserving the public 
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bring a public nuisance action to protect federal lands,137 or to safe-
guard the public health. l38 In United States v. County Bd. of Ar-
lington County,139 for example, the federal government had standing 
in its unsuccessful public nuisance action seeking an injunction halt-
ing a Virginia highrise development.14o The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that the United 
States could bring such an action to protect federal property or to 
safeguard the general welfare. 141 
D. General Principles of Common-Law Public Nuisance 
Early courts recognized public nuisance primarily as a legal re-
course for plaintiffs seeking to prevent a defendant from blocking a 
highway or offending public morals. l42 Presently, plaintiffs may also 
bring public nuisance actions to abate environmental hazards-such 
as pollution-which threaten public healthl43 or the quality of life for 
citizens. 144 Private nuisance covers a more narrow spectrum of harms 
than public nuisance. 145 For example, unlike public nuisance, private 
nuisance actions must involve interference with a landowner~s use 
of land. 146 
health and safety, the federal government may justifiably seek equitable intervention 
of the courts to forestall irreparable damage or some other public nuisance. 
Id.; see also Squillace, supra note 9, at 89-90. Technically, were NPS to instigate a public 
nuisance action to protect a national park, the United States would be the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1979) 
(United States brought action to protect national park). To avoid confusion, this Comment 
treats NPS as the actual litigant. 
137 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.C. 1980) (where Sierra Club 
brought an action requesting court to order Department of Interior (DOl) to affirmatively 
protect federal rights threatened by energy development projects, court found that DOl could, 
at its discretion, bring a public nuisance action to protect national parks); Arlington County, 
487 F. Supp. 137, 139-40 (E.D. Va. 1979); Squillace, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
138 See Rainbow Family, 695 F. SUpp. at 326. 
139 487 F. SUpp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
140 See id. at 139-40. 
141 See id. at 140. 
142 See PLATER, supra note 135, at 123. 
143 See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 54-5 (D. Minn. 1974) (de-
fendant's discharge of carcinogens was public nuisance). 
144 See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 90, at 
644 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON] (act that interferes with public comfort or convenience 
might be public nuisance); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (w. Va. 1937) (court held that ugly junkyard, under certain circumstances, might be nuisance); 
Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1091 
(1970). 
146 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. h (1965). 
146 Id. Because public nuisance is the more appropriate action for NPS, this Comment avoids 
an analysis of private nuisance actions. Public and private nuisance claims, however, share 
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Federal common law and state laws share many of the same public 
nuisance principles. 147 Because courts only apply federal common-
law public nuisance in limited circumstances,148 it is not a well-
developed body of law. Thus, courts rely on general common-law 
public nuisance principles, many of which the states have codified, 149 
when deciding federal common-law public nuisance cases. 150 
A public nuisance at common law is an act, or failure to act, that 
inconveniences or harms members of the public who are exercising 
common rights. 151 Acts that interfere with the public health, safety, 
morals, or convenience are often public nuisances. 152 To win a public 
nuisance action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct 
constitutes substantial and unreasonable interference with the public 
or with public property.153 Thus, in order to find a public nuisance, 
a court must conclude that the defendant's conduct substantially 
damages public property,l54 or significantly disturbs,155 offends,156 or 
endangers the health of members of the public with ordinary physical 
stature and "sensibilities. "157 Furthermore, the court must find that 
many of the same elements. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 32 (1989). Thus, this Comment 
cites to some private nuisance cases to help determine a court's legal standard for a public 
nuisance. 
147 See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D. Va. 
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1965); infra notes 149-50 and 
accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text. 
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1965). 
150 Federal courts, when hearing federal common-law public nuisance cases, have referred 
to state law cases when formulating public nuisance standards. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) ("while federal law governs, consideration of state stan-
dards may be relevant"); Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 143 (court examined precedent 
from state courts in Virginia and Florida, as well as prior federal common-law precedent, 
prior to finding that the defendant's high rise did not constitute a public nuisance). 
151 See KEETON, supra note 144, § 90, at 643-44. 
152 A public nuisance is an "act or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or 
damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all' ... [including] ... interferences 
with the public health . . . public safety ... public morals ... public peace ... public comfort 
... public convenience .... " [d. 
153 See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 41-42 (1989). For the purposes of this Comment, "public 
property" means publicly owned property or private property owned by a private citizen 
bringing a public nuisance action. See supra notes 253--331 and accompanying text. 
154 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618,619-20 (1907). 
155 See, e.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 407-09 (D. Del. 1905). 
156 See, e.g., Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937) 
(court stated that proper test for aesthetic nuisance would be whether or not object or 
structure offended average persons in community); Note, supra note 144, at 1090. 
157 Note, S1tpra note 144, at 1090. See also KEETON for description of public nuisance and 
examples of conduct that constitutes a public nuisance. KEETON, supra note 144, § 90, at 643-
45. 
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the defendant's conduct decreases the environmental quality of the 
affected property to a level lower than that which the public reason-
ably expects. 158 
IV. PUBLIC NUISANCE ACTIONS: ELEMENTS AND INJUNCTIONS 
A. Elements Generally 
Normally, a plaintiff in a public nuisance action seeks injunctive 
relief. 159 To succeed, the plaintiff must first prove that the defendant 
is liable. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct 
substantially and unreasonably interferes with the public or with 
public property.160 After proving liability, the plaintiff must prove 
that an injunction is the only adequate remedy, and that the benefit 
of an injunction would outweigh the negative impact an injunction 
might have on the defendant or the public. 161 
B. Federal Common-Law Public Nuisance 
1. Substantial Interference Element 
A defendant's conduct satisfies the substantial interference ele-
ment of a public nuisance claim when that conduct causes significant 
harm to the public or public property.162 Often, courts measure a 
defendant's conduct objectively by gauging the conduct's effect on a 
plaintiff with ordinary physical stature and sensibilities. l63 The de-
fendant's conduct must threaten this reasonable plaintiff's health or 
offend one of the plaintiff's senses. l64 In the view of some state 
courts, conduct significantly harms a plaintiff where it presents him 
158 See Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619; United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 408-
11 (D. Del. 1905); KEETON, supra note 144, § 90, at 643-45; 58 AM. JUR. 2n Nuisances § 41-
42 (1989). 
159 See PLATER, supra note 135, at 128-30. 
160 See 58 AM. JUR. 2n Nuisances § 41-42 (1989). 
161 See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
162 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619-20 (1907) (emissions from 
industry that damaged land in Georgia was nuisance); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 
380 F. Supp. 11,54-55 (D. Minn. 1974) (defendant's discharge of pollutants that were harmful 
to public was public nuisance); Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (Or. 1975); KEETON, supra 
note 144, § 90, at 643-45. 
163 See United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 409-10 (Del. Cir. 1905); Note, supra note 144, at 
1090. 
164 See Reserve Mining, 380 F. Supp. at 54-55 (health threat); Luce, 141 F. at 408 (offensive 
odors); KEETON, supra note 144, § 90, at 643-44 (offensive noises, odors, vibrations, smoke 
might be public nuisances). 
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or her with a visually offensive sight. 165 Finally, most courts consider 
conduct to be significantly damaging to a plaintiff's property where 
it injures plant life, pollutes air or soil, or hinders the plaintiff's 
ordinary use of the property.166 
Courts usually find that a defendant's conduct that physically in-
jures members of the public, or seriously threatens the public health, 
satisfies the substantial interference element. 167 Thus, in United 
States v. Reserve Mining CO.,168 where the defendant mining com-
pany discharged carcinogens into Lake Superior, the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota considered the defendant 
company's discharge to be a public nuisance. 169 The Reserve Mining 
court found the substantial interference element satisfied because 
the carcinogens endangered public health. 170 The defendant's pollu-
tion threatened ordinary citizens with an elevated risk of cancer. 171 
Conduct that creates odors or noises that would cause an ordinary 
person either to be significantly uncomfortable or ill, or to change 
his or her work habits or lifestyle, also meets the substantial inter-
ference element.172 Thus, in United States v. Luce,173 the United 
States Circuit Court for the Delaware Circuit found that a fish and 
fertilizer company's odors that made inmates and employees of the 
nearby quarantine station nauseous were sufficiently substantial to 
constitute a nuisance. 174 The Luce court was concerned that employ-
ees' nausea and discomfort would detract from their ability to work 
165 See Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37, 39 (Or. 1975)(visual interference that offends or annoys 
normal person in community may be nuisance); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 
191 S.E. 368, 369-71 (W. Va. 1937) (object that is offensive to view of average citizens in 
community may be nuisance); Note, supra note 144, at 1078. In United States v. County 
Board of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia hinted that a building that detracted from an 
average visitor's view of monuments in Washington, D.C. might be a public nuisance. See id. 
at 144. 
166 See Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 618, 619-20 (widespread damage to soil and plant life 
was public nuisance); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 225-26 (8th Cir. 
1907), cert denied, 207 U.S. 597 (1907) (irreparable damage to trees was nuisance). 
167 See, e.g., Reserve Mining, 380 F. Supp. at 54--55; Godfrey, 158 F. at 225-26; KEETON, 
supra note 144, § 90, at 643 (lists "interference with public health" first among types of 
interference that constitute public nuisance). 
168 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). 
169 I d. at 56. 
170 See id. at 54--55. 
171 See id. 
172 See United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 407-10 (Del. Cir. 1905); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 
802, 804-05 (Utah 1961) (defendant's noises created nuisance). 
173 141 F. 385 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
174 See id. at 407-08. 
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effectively.175 Similarly, a defendant's conduct that creates noises 
that would interrupt an ordinary person's sleep or solitude on their 
property meets the substantial interference threshold. 176 
Some courts have found, and some have implied, that conduct that 
presents members of the public with a sight that would offend the 
taste of an ordinary person satisfies the substantial interference 
element of a public nuisance claim. 177 In United States v. County 
Bd. of Arlington County, 178 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia found that the defendant's proposed 
highrise development across the Potomac River from Washington 
D.C. was not a public nuisance in part because it would not impair 
the average visitor's view of the Capital's parks and monuments. 179 
Visitors, the court reasoned, would only see the defendant's build-
ings when viewing monuments from certain angles. 180 Though the 
Arlington County court flatly stated that "unsightliness or offense 
to the esthetic senses is not sufficient to constitute a public nuisance," 
it implied that tall structures which detracted from the average 
visitor's view might be public nuisances. 181 
While federal courts have only hinted at the possibility that a 
visual interference might satisfy the substantial interference ele-
ment, some state courts have explicitly concluded that visual inter-
ference may be substantial enough to be a nuisance. 182 Thus, accord-
ing to some jurisdictions, where the sight of a structure offends 
average members of a community, the structure satisfies the sub-
stantial interference element of a nuisance claim. 183 In Parkersburg 
Builders Material Co. v. Barrack,l84 where residents were upset by 
the view of the defendant's nearby auto junkyard, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the junkyard was not 
175 See id. 
176 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 803-05; KEETON, supra note 144, § 90, at 644. 
177 See Note, supra note 144, at 1076; see also Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 
191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937). 
178 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
179 See id. at 143-44. 
H;o See id. 
181 See id. But see Squillace, supra note 9, at 92-93. Squillace notes the potential for the 
concept of an aesthetic nuisance, but states that the Arlington County court failed to consider 
valid aesthetic nuisance arguments under federal common law. Id. 
182 See, e.g., Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 370-71 (W. Va. 
1937); see also Note, supra note 144, at 1078-79 (minority of jurisdictions have begun to 
recognize visual aesthetic nuisance claims). 
183 See Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37, 39 (Or. 1975); Barrack, 191 S.E. at 370-7l. 
184 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937). 
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an enjoinable nuisance because too few people lived nearby.l85 The 
Barrack court, however, reasoned that if the junkyard had been in 
a residential community, its sight would have created a nuisance by 
offending average members of the community. 186 
Finally, courts find that conduct creates substantial interference 
where it significantly damages public property by injuring plant life, 
polluting air or soil, or hindering the public's ordinary use of the 
property.187 A defendant's destruction of crops or vegetation on pub-
lic land constitutes substantial interference. l88 Similarly, conduct 
that pollutes the air or soil is likely to satisfy the substantial inter-
ference element. 189 Thus, in City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey 
Clay Mfg. Co. ,190 where the defendant city discharged sewage into 
a creek on the plaintiff's stock farm, contaminating a pasture, the 
court found the interference sufficiently substantial to warrant a 
nuisance claim. 191 
2. Unreasonable Interference Element 
After finding the public-nuisance defendant to have caused sub-
stantial interference, a court must then consider whether the inter-
ference is unreasonable. 192 A defendant's conduct unreasonably in-
terferes with a plaintiff where the conduct decreases the 
environmental quality of a plaintiff's property to a level lower than 
185 [d. at 371; see also Hay, 530 P.2d at 39. In Hay, the plaintiff complained that the 
defendant's fence, built on property between the plaintiff's property and a beach, was un-
sightly. [d. at 38. The Supreme Court of Oregon, finding the substantial interference threshold 
unmet, held that the fence was not a nuisance. Id. at 39. The Hay court, however, citing to 
other jurisdictions for support, explicitly recognized that a sight that offended an average 
person in a community might be a nuisance. [d. In addition, the court stated that "although 
there is authority to the contrary, we begin with the assumption that in the appropriate case 
recovery will be permitted under the law of nuisance for an interference with visual aesthetic 
sensibilities. " [d. 
186 Barrack, 191 S.E. at 371. 
187 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619-20 (1907); American Smelting 
& Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 225-26 (8th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 597 (1907) 
(destruction of trees). 
188 See Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 619-20 (sulfurous fumes from defendant's industry 
caused "considerable" damage to forests and plant life in plaintiff state); Godfrey, 158 F. at 
225 (fumes from defendant's smelting operations destroyed plaintiffs' trees). 
189 See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 335-37 
(1933);Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 619 (Court stated that citizens have right to breathe 
clean air); United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 313, 328-30 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (court 
reasoned that evidence that large gathering in park would cause severe damage to parklands' 
environment would satisfy substantial interference element). 
190 289 U.S. 334 (1933). 
191 See id. at 603-04. 
192 KEETON, supra note 144, § 88, at 629; see Squillace, supra note 9, at 88. 
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that which the plaintiff reasonably expects. 193 Whether the interfer-
ence is unreasonable often depends on the location and factual cir-
cumstances of the case. 194 In determining the unreasonableness of 
the defendant's interference, courts weigh the harm the interference 
creates against the harm that the defendant and the public would 
experience as a result of the judicial remedy. 195 
Often, conduct that satisfies the unreasonable interference stan-
dard creates a condition unlike the conditions that previously existed 
in the affected region. 196 Thus, in United States v. Luce,197 the United 
States Circuit Court for the Circuit of Delaware found the effect of 
the defendant company's fish odors unreasonable because the odors 
permeated a quarantine station whose employees and inmates were 
not accustomed to such strong industrial smells. 198 Similarly, in Par-
kersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack,199 the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia implied that it would have enjoined an 
ugly auto junkyard if the junkyard was in a residential community 
where residents would not expect such a facility. 200 
Another important component of unreasonableness is a defend-
ant's failure to mitigate harm. 201 Courts might expect defendants to 
reduce the possibility of injury by operating in a location removed 
from potential plaintiffs,202 or by reducing their activity's level of 
interference. 203 The unreasonable defendant in Luce, for example, 
might have sited its operation in a more appropriate industrial 10-
cation.204 Similarly, in United States v. Reserve Mining CO.,205 the 
court implied that one reason for finding the defendant's activity to 
193 See Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 619; United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 408-11 (Del. 
Cir. 1905); KEETON, supra note 144, § 88, at 629. 
194 KEETON, supra note 144, § 88, at 630; Squillace, supra note 9, at 88; see also United 
States V. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 330 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 
195 See Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. at 321 (court combined analysis of unreasonableness 
with "balancing of the equities" to determine appropriate remedy); Squillace, supra note 9, 
at 88. 
196 See Luce, 141 F. at 411. 
197 141 F. 385 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
198 See id. at 407-11. 
199 191 S.E. 368 (W. Va. 1937). 
200 See id. at 371. 
201 See United States V. Luce, 141 F. 385, 417-18 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
202 See id. 
203 See, e.g., United States V. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D. Minn. 1974) 
(public nuisance where plaintiff had not made significant effort to use safer method of dis-
charging pollutants). 
204 See Luce, 141 F. at 417; see also Shaw V. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah 
1950) (court barred defendant from building asphalt plant near plaintiff's property where 
defendant had several other potential locations for plant). 
205 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). 
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be a public nuisance was the defendant's failure to use safer tech-
nology to prevent the discharge of carcinogens into Lake Superior. 206 
In addition to considering whether the plaintiff is accustomed to 
the kind of interference the defendant causes, courts will weigh the 
severity of the interference against the degree of harm a nuisance 
finding might have on the defendant or other members of the pub-
lic. 207 Where the interference kills, or threatens human health, the 
interference is pro~ably unreasonable.208 Thus, in Saint Joseph Lead 
Co. v. Prather,209 where the defendant's stored explosives caused a 
death, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
found the defendant's conduct unreasonable because it created an 
excessive danger. 210 
When considering interference that damages the plaintiff's prop-
erty or offends the plaintiff's senses, as opposed to interference that 
threatens the plaintiff's health, courts appear to give more weight 
to the harmful effect a remedy would have on the defendant or 
members of the public who benefit from the defendant's conduct. 211 
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. ,212 for example, where the plain-
tiff complained that sulfur dioxide from the defendant company dam-
aged forests and crops throughout five Georgia counties, the United 
States Supreme Court ordered the defendant company either to 
reduce its pollution or stop operating.213 Although the Court consid-
ered the harm an injunction would have on those dependent on the 
company, it ordered the injunction because the pollution's harmful 
effects were considerable and widespread. 214 Similarly, in Robie v. 
Lillis,215 the defendant's boathouse and trucks did not cause an 
206 See id. at 18. 
207 See, e.g., St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Prather, 278 F.2d 301, 303 (8th Cir. 1956) (storing 
explosives that caused death was a nuisance); KEETON, supra note 144, § 88, at 630. 
208 See Prather, 278 F.2d at 303-05. 
209 238 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1956). 
210 See id. at 303-05; See also United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 54-
55 (D. Minn. 1974) (court found defendant's discharge of carcinogens unreasonable). 
211 In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907), for example, although the 
United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's pollution created a nuisance by 
damaging land in Georgia, it appeared to recognize the potential harm caused by shutting 
down an industry. See id. at 619-20; see also Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 157, 161 (N.H. 
1972) (where plaintiff complained that defendant's boat storage shed and trucks were ugly 
and created noises and dust, court paid deference to region's economic reliance on boating, 
and found conduct not unreasonable). 
212 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907). 
213 [d. at 619-20. 
214 See id. at 620. 
215 299 A.2d 155, 161 (N.H. 1972). 
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unreasonable deterioration of the plaintiff's landscape. 216 The Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire gave considerable weight to the 
economic contribution the defendant's boat storage operation made 
to the community. 217 
3. Injunctive Relief 
Once a court finds that a defendant's conduct has caused substan-
tial and unreasonable interference, and thus constitutes a nuisance, 
the court will balance the equities of the case to determine an ap-
propriate remedy.218 Most often, a public nuisance plaintiff will seek 
an injunction. 219 Courts will grant injunctions when they determine 
that damages would not provide the plaintiff with an adequate rem-
edy, and that the need to prevent harm to the plaintiff outweighs 
the negative effect an injunction would have on the defendant or the 
public. 220 Courts prefer to avoid ordering the defendant completely 
to shut down an operation, often choosing instead to order the de-
fendant to modify the operation.221 
Courts will consider the need to abate the nuisance compelling 
where the defendant's interference causes widespread or severe 
harm to the plaintiff's health or property.222 Thus, in United States 
v. Reserve Mining CO.,223 although an injunction was likely to cause 
great difficulty for the defendant and local economy, the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota enjoined the 
defendant from discharging carcinogens because of the activity's 
216 [d. at 161. But see City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay, Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 
337--39 (1933) (although defendant sewage system operator was performing important public 
service, resulting damage to plaintiff's pasture was nuisance). 
217 See Robie, 299 A.2d at 161. 
218 See PLATER, supra note 135, at 113; see also W.S. Dickey Clay, 289 U.S. at 338-40 
(Court balanced city's interest in unobstructed sewage system against plaintiff's interest in 
uncontaminated land). 
219 See PLATER, supra note 135, at 128-30. 
220 See, e.g., W.S. Dickey Clay, 289 U.S. at 338-40 (no injunction where city relied on 
sewage system that polluted plaintiff's land, and damages would satisfy plaintiff); United 
States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 407-08, 419 (Del. Cir. 1905) (injunction necessary to maintain 
effectiveness of quarantine station overcome by defendant's fish odors); United States v. 
County Ed. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 144 (E.D. Va. 1979) (no injunction where 
injunction would cause financial harm because defendant already had begun constructing high 
rise). 
221 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 620 (1907) (Court gave 
defendant opportunity to decrease pollution before ordering defendant to shut down). 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 54-55 (N.D. Minn. 
1974) (court, concerned with defendant's discharge of carcinogens, ordered injunction). 
223 380 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Minn. 1974). 
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serious threat to the public health. 224 Similarly, in Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co. ,225 although shutting down the defendant company 
would cause hardship, the court ordered the defendant either to 
complete certain structural changes in its physical plant, or close 
down entirely.226 In addition, a court may enjoin conduct that inter-
feres with a plaintiff's senses,227 though such conduct might not merit 
the same concern as health threats or direct property damage. Thus, 
in spite of potential costs to the defendant, the Luce court ordered 
the defendant fish company to stop producing odors that disturbed 
workers and inmates at a nearby federal quarantine station. 228 
Courts are less likely to favor abating a nuisance where an in-
junction would compromise the overall public interest, or severely 
harm the defendant. 229 Thus, although leakage from the city sewage 
system was severely damaging the plaintiff's pasture, the United 
States Supreme Court in City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay 
Mfg. CO.230 refused to order an injunction.231 The Court based its 
decision in part on the fact that the public relied on the sewage 
system.232 Likewise, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia in United States v. County Ed. of Arlington 
County233 refused to prohibit further construction of a high-rise de-
velopment. 234 The Arlington County court was concerned that if it 
found a public nuisance, an injunction would impose excessive costs 
on a defendant who had begun to build a project prior to the law-
suit. 235 If shutting down a defendant's operation is too severe a 
224 [d. at 55-56. 
225 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907). 
226 [d. at 620. 
227 See, e.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 419 (Del. Cir. 1905); KEETON, supra note 
144, § 90, at 644. 
228 See Luce, 141 F. at 416-19. 
229 See City of Harrisonville, Mo. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338-39 (1933); 
see also United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Va. 
1979). 
230 289 U.S. 334 (1933). 
231 [d. at 338. 
232 See id. at 339; see also United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 329-30 (E.D. 
Tex. 1988) (court limited, but did not bar, large public gatherings where it was concerned 
with public's right to free expression); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,871-
73 (N.Y. 1970) (where defendant company's pollution caused damage that was "relatively 
small" in comparison to costs to defendant if ordered to shut down, court opted against ordering 
injunction unless defendant failed to pay damages to plaintiff landowners). 
233 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
234 See id. at 144. 
235 See id. 
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remedy, a court may either award damages or order less restrictive 
injunctive relief. 236 
A plaintiff may seek injunctive relief addressing a future nuisance 
as well as an existing nuisance. 237 If a defendant has plans that 
inevitably would create a nuisance, and the defendant is likely to 
carry out those plans, a court will consider ordering injunctive re-
lief.238 Thus, in Arlington County, the plaintiff sought an injunction 
against the defendant because the plaintiff claimed that the defend-
ant's development, once completed, would constitute a nuisance. 239 
Similarly, in United States v. Rainbow Family,240 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ordered injunctive 
relief on behalf of the U. S. government after finding that the de-
fendant demonstrators would create a nuisance by generating un-
sanitary camping conditions at scheduled protests.241 
C. Utah's Public Nuisance Law 
1. Background 
Utah is the home of Zion and four other national parks. NPS could 
bring a public nuisance action under federal common law or Utah 
law to protect Zion from the Theater project.242 An examination of 
Utah's nuisance law can serve as a model for NPS suits in Utah. 
Moreover, a concurrent analysis of Utah and federal public nuisance 
law might help illustrate the opportunities for NPS nuisance actions 
in other states. 
236 See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-40 
(1933) (court awarded damages); Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871-73. 
237 See, e.g., United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 329 (E.D. Tex. 1988) 
(court granted injunction limiting size of planned demonstration where federal government 
feared future gathering would damage Washington, D.C. park); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances 
§ 351 (1989). 
238 See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 351 (1989). 
[C]ourts are not required to wait for actual injuries to occur before a condition may 
be adjudged a nuisance and abated; that is, a court of equity may enjoin a threatened 
or anticipated nuisance, where it clearly appears that a nuisance will necessarily 
result from the contemplated act or thing which it is sought to enjoin. 
[d. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208). 
239 United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 140-44 (E.D. Va. 
1979). 
240 695 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Tex. 1988). 
241 See id. at 329-30. 
242 See supra notes 123-41 and accompanying text. 
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Because public nuisance laws in the different jurisdictions share 
many of the same principles, an analysis of Utah's public nuisance 
law resembles the preceding analysis of federal common-law public 
nuisance.243 Furthermore, Utah public and private nuisance law are 
very similar.244 Thus, an analysis of Utah public nuisance law re-
quires an evaluation of both public and private nuisance case law. 
The Utah Code defines public nuisance as conduct that threatens, 
harms, or disturbs the comfort or well-being of three or more per-
sons, or that interferes with three or more persons' use of prop-
erty.245 The Supreme Court of Utah, consistent with courts in other 
jurisdictions, regards public nuisance246 as conduct that substantially 
and unreasonably247 interferes with persons or property of members 
of the public. 248 Thus, to be a public nuisance, a defendant's conduct 
must cause significant harm to ordinary members of the public,249 or 
243 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
244 Utah courts have applied a similar analysis to both private and public nuisance cases. 
The primary difference between the two varieties of nuisance seems to be that a public 
nuisance affects an interest common to the general public, instead of one or several individuals. 
See Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1990). The Court of Appeals of Utah 
has stated that the private nuisance statute "encompasses two types of nuisance developed 
under the common law: public and private nuisance." [d. Therefore, in developing a standard 
for public nuisance, one must look to public and private nuisance cases. 
245 
(1) A public nuisance ... consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform 
any duty, which act or omission either: 
A) Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health or safety of three 
or more persons; or 
B) Offends public decency; or 
C) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dan-
gerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, 
street, or highway; or 
D) In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of 
property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1990). 
The code further states that the county attorney, city attorney, or attorney general may 
bring an action to abate a public nuisance. [d. § 76-10-806. Although the code does not 
specifically empower other parties to initiate such an action, it does not expressly forbid other 
parties from bringing a public nuisance action. See id. The Court of Appeals of Utah has 
emphasized that its nuisance statutes do not modify common law doctrine. See Turnbaugh, 
793 P.2d at 942. 
246 Public and private nuisance standards are very similar. See supra note 244 and accom-
panying text. 
247 Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969). While Johnson 
differentiates between "substantial" and "unreasonable" interference, the Utah courts have, 
at times, combined the two into one "unreasonable" standard. See, e.g., Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d 
at 942; Dahl v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P. 269, 273 (Utah 1927). 
248 Solar Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 555 P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976). 
249 See Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1955) (to constitute nuisance, 
noises would have to disturb reasonable, objective person). 
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significant damage to a plaintiff's property.250 Furthermore, a de-
fendant's conduct must decrease the environmental quality of a plain-
tiff's property to a level lower than that which the plaintiff reason-
ably expects. 251 In determining whether a particular public nuisance. 
complaint meets this standard, a court will look closely at the par-
ticular facts of the case. 252 
2. Elements of a Public Nuisance Claim 
a. Substantial Interference Element 
The Supreme Court of Utah, like courts in other jurisdictions, has 
concluded that a defendant's conduct must substantially interfere 
with the plaintiff to constitute a public nuisance.253 A defendant's 
conduct satisfies the substantial interference element of a public 
nuisance claim where the conduct causes significant harm to the 
plaintiff, or where the defendant's conduct causes significant damage 
to the plaintiff's property. According to Utah courts, a defendant's 
conduct causes significant harm to a plaintiff where the conduct 
disturbs the physicaF54 or mental health255 of the plaintiff. 
Conduct that causes or threatens serious bodily injury to the 
plaintiff satisfies the substantial interference element. 256 The Utah 
Code states that injury or endangerment of health is one form of 
public nuisance. 257 In Pratt v. Hercules, Inc.,258 the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah held that a weapons manu-
facturer's business did not create a nuisance to surrounding land-
250 See, e.g., Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1950). 
251 For example, homeowners in a normally peaceful residential neighborhood, accustomed 
to enjoying quiet evenings, expect the community's night time environment to remain serene. 
When unforeseeable commotion outdoors deteriorates the quality of the community's environ-
ment, the commotion might be unreasonable. Thus, in Wade v. Fuller, a new drive-in cafe 
created a nuisance by attracting noisy, vulgar patrons who disturbed residents at night in a 
previously quiet area. See Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804-05 (Utah 1961). 
252 Dahl v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P. 269, 273 (Utah 1927). 
253 Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333,336 (Utah 1969). 
254 KEETON, supra note 144, § 8, at 627; see Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773,791-
92 (D. Utah 1982) (no nuisance where safety standards were met, thereby implying threat to 
safety might be nuisance). 
255 See, e.g., Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Utah 1959) (threat of "highly 
disturbing" noise); Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 332 (Utah 1969) (pigs' odors and 
squeals). 
256 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1990); Pratt, 570 F. Supp. at 791. 
257 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1990). 
258 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1982). 
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owners. 259 The court implied, however, that if the manufacturer 
failed government safety standards, or failed to satisfy a concerned 
local zoning commission, the manufacturer's conduct might have 
threatened the safety of plaintiffs enough to be a nuisance. 260 
A court is likely to find the substantial interference element sat-
isfied where the defendant's conduct would cause an ordinary person 
to become significantly uncomfortable,261 or would cause an ordinary 
person to change lifestyles. 262 Thus, a defendant who creates noises 
or odors that bother a reasonable plaintiff might cause substantial 
harm sufficient to constitute a nuisance. 263 Similarly, creating a gen-
eral commotion in a community can satisfy the substantial interfer-
ence standard. 264 
In Shaw v. Salt Lake County,265 for example, a city's operation of 
a planned asphalt plant would have constituted a nuisance because 
the plant probably would have exposed residents to intolerable 
noises and odors.266 Similarly, in Wade v. Fuller,267 the operation of 
a restaurant that attracted noisy youths and loud cars constituted a 
nuisance because it disturbed nearby residents. 268 The Wade court 
suggested that conduct that makes a homeowner decide to move, or 
forces a homeowner to live uncomfortably, satisfies the substantial 
interference element. 269 In Monroe City v. Arnold,270 the Utah Su-
259 See id. at 791-92. 
260 See id. 
261 See, e.g., Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1961) (causing "positive" discomfort 
may be nuisance); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Utah 1950) (expected noise 
and dust from planned asphalt plant would be nuisance). 
262 See Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 332 (Utah 1969) (hog ranch odors forced 
plaintiffs to shut windows). 
263 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 804 (loud noises that emanated from restaurant and disturbed 
neighbors was nuisance); Shaw, 224 P.2d at 1040-01 (smoke, dust, noise, and odors from 
similar asphalt plants convinced court it should forbid planned operation of defendant's plant). 
264 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 804 (restaurant patrons loud car-driving and conversations created 
nuisance); Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1943) (" ... [nloises, odors, 
gatherings of crowds of people mayor may not be an actionable nuisance depending upon the 
[circumstancesl ... "). 
265 224 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1950). 
266 See id. at 1040-41 (court referred to witness accounts of "unbearable" and "highly 
disturbing" noises from similar asphalt production facilities). 
267 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
268 See id. at 804-05 (court implied that general commotion caused by combination of loud 
voices, traffic, and collection of large numbers of youths caused sufficiently substantial harm); 
see also Brough, 242 P.2d at 672 (citing Hansen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No.1, 61 Idaho 
109 (1939)) (traffic, light, and crowds from night baseball games combined to cause nuisance 
in local neighborhood). 
269 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 804 ("[Tlhe law does not allow anyone ... to be driven from his 
home or compelled to live in positive discomfort .... "). 
270 452 P.2d 321 (Utah 1969). 
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preme Court found that the defendant's operation of a hog ranch 
that harbored loud squealing pigs and produced bad odors was a 
public nuisance.271 The bad odors in Monroe were forcing nearby 
residents to change their life-style by keeping windows closed.272 
Conduct that does not expose residents to a new type of harm or 
property damage, however, does not substantially interfere with 
those residents. 273 For example, in Dahl v. Utah Ref CO.,274 the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an unpleasant smell emanating from 
the defendant's factory was not a nuisance where the plaintiff's home 
was located in an industrial area near piles of trash dumped in vacant 
lots. 275 
Utah courts might find that a visually offensive sight satisfies the 
substantial interference element.276 To satisfy this element, the of-
fensive sight would have to make an ordinary person uncomfortable 
or hinder his or her life-style. 277 In Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n,278 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the defendant's planned car-
nival activities, to be carried out in front of the plaintiff's home, 
would be a nuisance. 279 Although the court was concerned primarily 
with the threat of noise and disorder, it supported its holding by 
citing to an Idaho case where the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
night baseball games constituted a nuisance in part because the 
games' bright lights disturbed nearby residents. 28o By referring to 
cases in other jurisdictions, 281 Brough demonstrates that Utah courts 
might consider cases in which courts have held that conduct that 
disturbs a plaintiff's aesthetic tastes causes substantial harm suffi-
271 I d. at 321-22. 
272 See id. at 322. 
273 See Dahl v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P.2d 269, 270, 273-74 (Utah 1927). 
274 262 P.2d 269 (1927). 
275 See id. at 270, 273-74; Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217,220-21 (Utah 1955) (no 
nuisance where defendant's conduct did not add to "noises, confusion and smells which emanate 
and exist in" the immediate vicinity of defendant). 
276 See Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1943); Note, supra note 
144, at 1077-79; infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text. 
277 See Brough, 142 P.2d at 672 (neighbors in community should be able to enjoy their homes 
in reasonable comfort); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. 
Va. 1937) ("[e]quity should act only where there is presented a situation which is offensive to 
the view of average persons of the community"). 
278 142 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1943). 
279Id. at 672-74. 
280 See id. The Brough court referred specifically to the night ballgame noise and traffic that 
created a nuisance in Hansen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No.1, 61 Idaho 109 (1939). Id. at 
672. In Hansen, light from the games also contributed to the nuisance. See Hansen, 61 Idaho 
at 116. 
281 Brough, 142 P.2d at 672. 
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cient to constitute a nuisance.282 A visual intrusion, however, would 
have to cause a plaintiff significant discomfort to constitute a nuis-
ance.283 Thus, in Wade v. Fuller,284 the Supreme Court of Utah 
distinguished between conduct that merely annoys a plaintiff and 
fails to be a nuisance, and conduct that causes a plaintiff so much 
discomfort that the plaintiff has difficulty enjoying his or her home 
environment. 285 
Finally, if a defendant's conduct significantly damages, or threat-
ens to damage, a plaintiff's property by polluting the air, causing 
pollutants to accumulate on the property, or hindering the plaintiff's 
ordinary use of the property, that conduct meets the substantial 
interference standard.286 In Shaw v. Salt Lake County,287 the Su-
preme Court of Utah enjoined a proposed asphalt plant because it 
threatened to pollute the plaintiffs' air with smoke and dust, and 
threatened to cause dust to collect on the plaintiffs' property.288 A 
defendant does not cause substantial harm, however, where the 
plaintiffs' property already has suffered from similar interference. 289 
Thus, in Coon v. Utah Constr. Co. ,290 although the defendant's trucks 
were creating dust, smoke, and vibrations, the plaintiff's nuisance 
complaint failed because other vehicles had similarly disturbed the 
plaintiff.291 Moreover, merely reducing property value does not sat-
isfy the substantial interference standard.292 The defendant's conduct 
must actually damage, or threaten to damage, the plaintiff's prop-
erty.293 
282 See Note, supra note 144, at 1078-90 (analyzing various case law and expounding on 
possibilities for successful visual nuisance actions). 
283 See, e.g., Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1961); see also Note, supra note 144, 
at 1080 (ordinarily, courts will not find visual nusiance). 
284 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
285 See id. at 804 ("[TJhe mere fact of an annoyance does not establish the existence of a 
nuisance. . . . "). 
286 See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text. 
287 224 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1950). 
288 See id. at 1040. 
289 See Coon v. Utah Constr. Co., 228 P.2d 997, 997-98 (Utah 1954); see infra notes 290-91 
and accompanying text. 
290 228 P.2d 997 (Utah 1954). 
291 See id. at 997-98. 
292 See Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773, 792-93 (D. Utah 1982) (plaintiffs' complaint 
that neighboring weapons manufacturer caused loss of speculative profits from nearby real 
estate holdings failed to state claim). 
293 See id. at 793-94. 
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b. Unreasonable Interference Element 
To constitute a public nuisance, the defendant's interference must 
be unreasonable as well as substantial. 294 A defendant's conduct 
unreasonably interferes with a plaintiff where the conduct decreases 
the environmental quality of the plaintiff's property to a level lower 
than that which the plaintiff reasonably expects.295 Thus, whether 
the defendant creates a noise,296 odor,297 bright light,298 vibrations,299 
vulgar conversation,30o or general state of commotion,30l the court 
considers the plaintiff's legitimate expectations. 
The court is more likely to accept a plaintiff's expectations of 
environmental quality where the plaintiff resided in or visited the 
affected location prior to the defendant's troubling conduct.302 Thus, 
in Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc.,303 where the defendant 
enlarged an outdoor theater in a residential neighborhood, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the resulting increase in noise and mis-
chief among patrons was unreasonable.304 The residents justifiably 
expected the level of serenity that existed prior to the plaintiff's 
expansion. 305 
A plaintiff's expectations of environmental quality are usually 
legitimate where the defendant creates a condition that is new to 
the locality.306 Thus, in Wade v. Fuller,307 the Utah Supreme Court 
found that the defendant's opening of a cafe in a residential area was 
unreasonable because the neighborhood was quiet at night prior to 
the cafe's existence. 308 Yet in Coon v. Utah Constr. CO.,309 where 
294 See Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1969); Squillace, 
supra note 9, at 88. 
295 See, e.g., Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802,804-05 (Utah 1961). Utah's standard is, generally, 
the same as that of the federal common law. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
296 See Johnson, 460 P.2d at 335. 
297 See Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 321-22 (Utah 1969). 
298 See Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1943) (citing Hansen v. 
Independent Sch. Dist. No.1, 61 Idaho 109 (1939), where traffic, light, and crowds from night 
baseball games combined to cause nuisance in local neighborhood). 
299 See Coon v. Utah Constr. Co., 228 P.2d 997,997-98 (Utah 1951). 
300 See Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1961). 
301 See id. at 804-05. 
302 See Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 334-46 (Utah 1969). 
303 460 P.2d 333 (Utah 1969). 
304 I d. at 334-36. 
305 See id. at 334--35. 
306 See Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804-05 (Utah 1961); Coon v. Utah Constr. Co., 228 
P.2d 997, 997-98 (Utah 1951); infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text. 
307 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
308 See id. at 804. 
309 228 P.2d 997 (Utah 1951). 
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the defendant construction company's trucks operated on a street 
that other truckers previously had used, the Supreme Court of Utah 
found that the defendant's driving was not unreasonable.310 Because 
trucks had traveled on the highway in the past,311 the plaintiffs had 
no legitimate expectation that trucks like the defendant's would not 
rumble along the highway. 312 
Where business practices are at issue, a plaintiff's expectations of 
environmental quality are legitimate where the defendant could mit-
igate damages by successfully operating in another location, at an-
other time, or by taking other measures. 313 In Shaw v. Salt Lake 
County,314 the defendant proposed siting an asphalt plant in a resi-
dential area, and the plaintiffs objected to the specter of equipment 
removing and processing gravel near their homes. 315 The court found 
the defendant's proposal unreasonable because the defendant could 
have located the plant at a greater distance from the residential 
area. 316 Similarly, the Wade court found an operator of a drive-in 
cafe's conduct unreasonable.317 The Wade court thus affirmed a lower 
court order stipulating that the cafe operate at hours more amenable 
to neighborhood residents.318 Where a business limits interference 
with potential plaintiffs as much as possible without endangering its 
economic survival, the interference is less likely to be unreasona-
ble.319 
In determining the legitimacy of the plaintiff's expectations of 
environmental quality, a court will consider the extent to which the 
public benefits from the defendant's conduct. 32o The more beneficial 
a defendant's conduct or operations are to the community, state, or 
310 Id. at 997-9S. 
311 Id. 
312 See id. 
313 See, e.g., Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d S02, S04 (Utah 1961); Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 
P.2d 217,220 (1955); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1038-42 (Utah 1950). 
314 224 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1950). 
315Id. at 103S. 
316 See id. at 1042. 
317 Wade, 365 P.2d at S04-05. The Wade court implied that the defendant should consider 
additional mitigation measures, including modification of the patrons' behavior. Id. 
318Id. at S03, S05. 
319 See, e.g., Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1955). In Hatch, the 
defendant business, headquartered next to the plaintiff's property, transported road tars and 
oils from the headquarters to various roadways. Id. at 21S. The Hatch court noted that 
although the defendant had made a good faith effort to keep the premises clean and quiet, 
the process of supplying oil and tar to road workers required workers to operate through the 
night at the headquarters. Id. Consequently, the court found the defendant's noises and fumes 
not unreasonable. Id. 
320 See, e.g., id. 
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nation, the less likely the court is to recognize the plaintiff's expec-
tations of environmental quality.321 In Hatch v. W.S. Hatch CO.,322 
the plaintiff complained that the defendant oil and tar transport 
business-which chose to base its operations near the plaintiff's 
house-created intolerable noises, fumes, and light.323 The Supreme 
Court of Utah implied that the plaintiff's expectations were unrea-
sonable because the oil and tar contributed to important road re-
pairs.324 Similarly, in Pratt v. Hercules, Inc.,325 the fact that the 
defendant's production of explosives for the federal government 
served important security interests may have influenced the decision 
of the United States District Court for the District of Utah in favor 
of the defendant.326 
In determining whether or not a plaintiff's expectation of envi-
ronmental quality is reasonable, Utah courts weigh several factors 
at once.327 Citizens, according to Utah courts, have a right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of their homes, public ways, and common 
areas. 328 A business cannot necessarily move into a quiet neighbor-
hood and create additional noise, pollution, or other negative ef-
fects. 329 At the same time, all citizens are expected to endure some 
conduct that has annoying results. 330 Court opinions reflect the idea 
that industry is important enough to the welfare of communities and 
the state to excuse some of its pollution and other negative by-
products, particularly where the business does its best to reduce 
environmental damage. 331 
321 See id.; Pratt v. Hercules, Inc. 570 F. Supp. 773, 791-92 (D. Utah 1982); infra notes 
322-26 and accompanying text. 
322 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955). 
323 [d. at 218. 
324 See id. at 221. The court stressed the importance of balancing equities to determine the 
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct. See id. "[W]hether or not an actionable nuisance 
exists must depend upon weighing the gravity of harm to the plaintiffs against the utility and 
reasonableness of defendants' conduct." [d. 
325 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1982). 
326 See id. at 791-92. 
327 See, e.g., Hatch, 283 P.2d at 220 (test for nuisance is "the reasonableness of the use [of 
property] complained of in the particular locality and in the manner and under the circum-
stances of the case"). 
328 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1990); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d. 802, 804 (Utah 1961). 
329 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333,335 (Utah 1969) (erection 
of movie screen across from plaintiff residents resulting in noise, traffic, and trespassers, was 
nuisance). 
330 See Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773, 792 (D. Utah 1982). 
331 Thus, a plaintiff's dissatisfaction with an important industry that tries to mitigate dam-
ages might not merit a nuisance finding. See, e.g., Hatch, 283 P.2d at 221. 
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3. Injunctive Relief 
Once a court holds a defendant liable for public nuisance, it pro-
ceeds to consider an appropriate remedy.332 Most often, public nuis-
ance plaintiffs seek injunctions.333 A Utah court will grant an in-
junction if the court determines that the need to abate or prevent 
injury to a plaintiff outweighs the societal benefit of a defendant's 
activities.334 A court usually prefers to order a defendant to modify 
rather than terminate its conduct. 335 
The rationale for abating or preventing harm to a plaintiff is strong 
where a defendant's conduct interferes with residents and visitors 
throughout an entire neighborhood. 336 Thus, in Monroe City v. Ar-
nold,337 the Supreme Court of Utah enjoined a hog ranch whose 
offensive noises and odors affected a nearby neighborhood.338 Like-
wise, the Wade v. Fuller court affirmed a limited injunction against 
operators of a drive-in cafe whose patrons unreasonably disturbed 
residents throughout the surrounding neighborhood.339 In addition, 
while courts seem most concerned with interference that affects an 
entire community, the Monroe court expressed concern for pedes-
trians who encounter the interference while passing through the 
community. 340 
Courts also are inclined to protect a plaintiff when a defendant 
fails to take available action to mitigate harm. If a defendant could 
operate effectively in a different location, at a different time, or take 
other mitigating measures, a court is likely to order an injunction.341 
332 See, e.g., Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037,1041-42 (Utah 1950) (after finding 
defendant would create nuisance if allowed to carry out plans for operation of asphalt plant, 
court considered possible equitable remedies). 
333 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1965). A plaintiff can only recover 
damages in a public nuisance action if he or she has suffered a type of harm that is unique 
from the harm inflicted on other members of the public. [d. Thus, especially where the 
government sues on behalf of the public, the appropriate remedy would be an injunction. 
334 See Shaw, 224 P.2d at 1041-42. 
335 See Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 803-05 (Utah 1961) (instead of shutting down defend-
ants' restaurant, court required defendant to reduce noise and imposed limits on restaurant's 
hours of operation). 
336 See Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 321-22 (Utah 1969) (public nuisance where 
noises and odors from hog ranch "permeated" neighborhood). 
337 [d. at 321. 
338 See id. at 321-22. 
339 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 804-05. 
340 See Monroe, 452 P.2d at 322. 
341 See Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Utah 1950) (in affirming injunction 
against planned asphalt plant, court emphasized that defendant could operate plant success-
fully elsewhere). 
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Before ordering an injunction, however, a court may demand modi-
fications that might help protect the plaintiff's interests. 342 In Wade, 
for example, the court attempted to prevent the injury the defend-
ant's noisy drive-in cafe caused by ordering the owner to close ear-
lier.343 Conversely, if a defendant business attempts to limit the harm 
to a plaintiff, a court will be more reluctant to order an injunction. 344 
Utah courts will award plaintiffs injunctive relief to address future 
nuisances as well as existing nuisances. 345 If a court finds that there 
is a reasonable probability that the defendant, by carrying out plans, 
will create a nuisance, the court may grant an injunction.346 Thus, 
the Shaw court enjoined the defendant from carrying out its future 
plans to operate an asphalt plant because the operation of the plant 
probably would constitute a nuisance. 347 Similarly, the Brough v. Ute 
Stampede Ass'n348 court enjoined the defendant from carrying out 
its planned operation of carnival rides and concession stands because 
of the likelihood that the defendant's activities would constitute a 
nuisance. 349 
V. PUBLIC NUISANCE: A LEGAL TOOL THAT THE NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE SHOULD UTILIZE TO PROTECT NATIONAL PARKS 
A. Why NPS Should Bring Public Nuisance Actions to Prevent 
Harmful External Development 
NPS should use every available means to carry out its mission to 
protect the environmental quality of parks. Commercial development 
outside of national park boundaries-a phenomenon that poses a 
substantial threat to parks across the country-deserves NPS's ut-
most attention. NPS should act aggressively to minimize harm from 
external development. 
342 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 803-05; see Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Modern Status of 
Rules as to Balance of Convenience or Social Utility as Affecting Relief from Nuisance, 40 
A.L.R. 3d 601, 608 (1971). 
343 Wade, 365 P.2d at 803-05. 
344 See Monroe, 452 P.2d at 321 (although court enjoined defendant's business, it did so less 
willingly after recognizing defendant's "efforts to keep the premises reasonably clean"); 
Purver, supra note 342, at 608. 
345 See Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1943); see also Shaw, 224 
P.2d at 1041-42 (injunction barring construction and operation of asphalt plant). 
346 See Brough, 142 P.2d at 673-74. 
347 See Shaw, 224 P.2d at 1040-41. 
348 142 P.2d 670 (Utah 1982). 
349 See id. at 672-74. 
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Although NPS probably does not have regulatory jurisdiction be-
yond park boundaries, it has the power to seek injunctions through 
public nuisance actions where it believes development projects sub-
stantially and unreasonably harm parks or park visitors.350 Courts 
have recognized public nuisance as a proper avenue for government 
officials to use to protect public lands. 351 Thus, where external de-
velopment threatens national parks and park visitors, and an in-
junction is the best remedy, public nuisance provides NPS with a 
particularly appropriate legal recourse. 
B. Application of Law: A Choice of Federal Common Law or 
State Law 
A federal court would apply federal common law to an NPS public 
nuisance claim alleging that a development project beyond park 
boundaries threatened a park with substantial and unreasonable 
harm. 352 The federal government has an important interest in pro-
tecting federal lands. 353 In United States v. County Bd. of Arlington 
County,354 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia applied federal common law to NPS's public nuisance 
action to protect a national park in Washington D.C. from an aes-
thetically intrusive high-rise development. 355 Like the Arlington 
County court, other federal courts would apply federal common law 
to NPS public nuisance complaints against external developers. 356 
The Park Act does not preempt federal common-law public nuis-
ance because NPS does not comprehensively regulate external ac-
tivities.357 Other federal statutes, however, may prevent a court from 
applying federal common law to some harmful effects of commercial 
development, such as air or water pollution.358 The Clean Water Act, 
350 See supra notes 104-09, 123-27, 136--38, 159-60 and accompanying text. 
361 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
362 See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 139-40 (E.D. 
Va. 1979); Squillace, supra note 9, at 89; see also supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. 
The court could rely, however, on state public nuisance law principles as well as federal law. 
See supra notes 128--32 and accompanying text. 
363 See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 139-40; Squillace, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
364 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
355 I d. at 139-40. 
366 See id.; Squillace, supra note 9, at 89. 
367 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 
(1981); United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 139-40 (E.D. Va. 
1979); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, § 6.1-6.2, at 295,310-11; EVERHART, supra note 1, at 
75; supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
368 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-19 (1981) (Clean Water Act preempted application 
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for example, may prevent a court from applying federal common law 
to an NPS complaint against a development's pollution of water. 359 
NPS might succeed, however, with the argument that federal pol-
lution statutes should not preempt federal common-law nuisance 
claims brought to protect national parks because the statutes do not 
address the specific problems in the parks. 360 
More importantly, NPS lawsuits against commercial developments 
should focus on the projects' visual interference and noises. The 
federal government does not comprehensively regulate the architec-
ture and lighting of construction projects. Public nuisance actions 
focusing on commercial structures and lighting are less likely to 
encounter federal common-law preemption difficulties than would 
actions solely directed at air or water pollution sources.361 
NPS should attempt to bring public nuisance actions under federal 
common law, as opposed to state law, because of the federal govern-
ment's interest in protecting national parks. 362 Moreover, federal 
common law would provide uniformity to NPS public nuisance ac-
tions, whereas state law outcomes might vary from state to state. 363 
Nonetheless, NPS may also bring public nuisance actions under the 
state law where a development is located.364 Because many state and 
federal jurisdictions share similar public nuisance law principles, 
NPS should have a strong opportunity to succeed in state law, 
regardless of the potential prejudice a jurisdiction might have in 
favor of a home-state defendant. Furthermore, NPS might deter-
mine that a particular jurisdiction is sympathetic to nuisance actions 
based on interference with a plaintiff's aesthetic environment. 365 
C. Chances for Success on the Merits Under Federal Common 
Law 
NPS would probably succeed in convincing a court that at least 
some of the development projects springing up near park boundaries 
of federal common-law public nuisance in interstate dispute over polluted water); United 
States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.N.J. 1982) (Clean Air Act preempted federal 
common-law public nuisance in part of complaint that related to landfill operator's pollution of 
air); Squillace, supra note 9, at 94. 
359 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-19 (1981); Squillace, supra note 9, at 94. 
360 See Squillace, supra note 9, at 104 n.37. 
361 See id. at 91-94; supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text. 
362 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 
137, 139-40 (E.D. Va. 1979); Squillace, supra note 9, at 89. 
363 See Squillace, supra note 9, at 89. 
364 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
365 See, e.g., Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37, 39 (Or. 1975). 
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constitute public nuisances under federal common law. 366 First, a 
court likely would find that some developments substantially inter-
fere with park visitors by creating visual obstructions, noises, odors, 
and commotion that would offend and disturb ordinary park visi-
tors.367 Thus, unlike United States v. County Rd. of Arlington 
County,368 where the court concluded that a highrise development 
within view of the Capitol did not constitute a nuisance because it 
did not offend the average visitor,369 a court would probably find that 
developments in more remote areas offend the average visitor seek-
ing the solace and unspoiled beauty of nature. 370 In addition, as in 
Wade v. Fuller,371 where the Utah Supreme Court stated that by 
driving homeowners out of their homes, even a lawful business would 
be a nuisance,372 a development on a park boundary may satisfy the 
substantial interference standard by inducing park- visitors to leave 
a favorite park or park area. In short, some developments create 
noises, bright lights, odors, or ugly visages that would cause ordi-
nary park visitors to change habits by seeking alternative vacation 
sites.373 Arguably, such developments would satisfy the substantial 
interference standard of a court that has demonstrated respect for 
aesthetic values. 374 
After satisfying the substantial interference element of a federal 
common-law public nuisance, NPS, in many cases, probably would 
convince a court that a development unreasonably interfered with 
park visitors. NPS could persuasively argue that many develop-
ments create a type of interference or condition that denigrates park 
366 This Section of the Comment focuses on federal common-law public nuisance. Federal 
common-law shares, and borrows from, many of the same principles as state common law. 
See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972). For application of state public 
nuisance law, see infra Section vI. 
367 See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143-44 (E.D. 
Va. 1979); Note, supra note 144, at 1077-79; see also supra notes 177-81 and accompanying 
text. 
368 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
369 See id. at 143-44. 
370 See Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937) 
(court implied that hypothetical junkyard in residential community would offend average 
resident and be a nuisance); SAX, supra note 20, at 46 (description of aesthetic value of 
national parks to visitors); Squillace, supra note 9, at 92-93 (suggesting that courts should 
recognize aesthetic nuisance in certain situations); Note, supra note 144, at 1091. 
371 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
372 See id. at 804. 
373 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
374 See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 143-44; Wade, 365 P.2d at 804; Squillace, supra 
note 9, at 92; Note, supra note 144, at 1075-79 (citing variety of state court cases indicating 
recognition of aesthetic nuisances). 
1993] NATIONAL PARKS 799 
environments to quality levels that visitors find unreasonably low. 375 
Thus, as in United States v. Luce,376 where a factory owner inter-
fered with the plaintiff's workers by subjecting them to obnoxious 
odors unlike any that previously existed, a court might find that the 
development of unsightly structures-with their accompanying 
noises, lights, and odors-next to an all-natural park would unrea-
sonably interfere with park visitors.377 In addition, in many cases, 
NPS forcefully could contend that developers could build successful 
pr.ojects in locations less objectionable to park visitors.378 In Luce, 
for example, the United States Circuit Court for the Delaware Cir-
cuit supported its finding of unreasonable interference by noting that 
the defendant, with mUltiple siting options, chose to operate where 
odors were certain to reach the plaintiff's quarantine station.379 Like 
the Luce court, a court hearing an NPS complaint might find that a 
developer unreasonably interfered with park visitors by choosing to 
operate immediately next to a park. A court would be inclined to 
make such a finding where a developer, choosing from among mul-
tiple options, chose the option closest to a park. 380 
Consistent with its analysis of the unreasonableness of a devel-
opment's interference with a park, a court may issue an injunction 
preventing a developer from using a particular site. 381 NPS arguably 
deserves injunctive relief when a defendant chooses to site a devel-
opment close to a park, ignoring promising sites located further from 
the park. 382 The benefits of the injunction would outweigh the harm 
to the developer and the community.383 Unlike City of Harrisonville 
v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. CO.,384 where an injunction would have 
disrupted the city's sewage system, an injunction against a developer 
would not threaten the public interest. 385 A developer often could 
376 See infra notes 376-80 and accompanying text. 
376 141 F. 385 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
377 See id. at 407-1l. 
378 See id.; infra note 379 and accompanying text. 
879 See Luce, 141 F. at 407-11. 
380 See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1933); 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619-20 (1907); supra notes 201-06 and 
accompanying text. 
381 See W.S. Dickey Clay, 289 U.S. at 338-40; 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 351 (1989) (court 
may issue injunction to prevent future nuisance); infra notes 382-87 and accompanying text. 
382 See W.S. Dickey Clay, 289 U.S. at 338-40; United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. 
Supp. 314, 330 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Utah 
1950). 
388 See, e.g., W.S. Dickey Clay, 289 U.S. at 338-40. 
384 289 U.S. 334 (1933). 
386 See id. at 339. 
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locate elsewhere and still earn a profit and help support the local 
economy.386 Furthermore, if NPS sued to prevent the construction 
of a development prior to groundbreaking, it would not have to ask 
the court to force a developer to accept financial hardship. 387 
D. Taking Advantage of a Useful Legal Recourse 
Public nuisance law is a legal avenue that NPS could use success-
fully to seek injunctions against neighboring development projects 
that threaten the environment of national parks across the country. 
NPS should take immediate advantage of this area of law because it 
would help NPS fulfill its statutory obligation to protect parks for 
future generations of park visitors.388 While courts historically have 
hesitated to find that visual interference may be a public nuisance, 
courts increasingly have begun to recognize the value of aesthetics 
and environmental preservation. 389 Given this recognition of aes-
thetics and the environment, and because public nuisance law would 
force courts to weigh the interests of park visitors against those of 
developers who could succeed with developments removed from park 
boundaries, NPS could win in court. NPS should be able to convince 
courts to order developers to build structures without detracting 
from the parks' environment. NPS is ignoring its responsibility by 
not challenging courts with public nuisance claims aimed at preserv-
ing our national heritage. 
VI. PUBLIC NUISANCE AND THE ZION NATIONAL PARK CASE 
Odyssey's development immediately next to Zion National Park 
provides an important example of a threat NPS should attempt to 
address with a public nuisance claim. NPS could probably win a 
court order mandating that Odyssey move the Theater to a location 
further removed from Zion's south entrance and Watchman Camp-
ground. If Odyssey reneged on its promise to scale down its original 
plans, NPS's suit would be even more likely to succeed. 
386 Like Odyssey, other developers surely could find locations where they could succeed 
without threatening park environments. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
387 See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Va. 
1979) (court stated that "the Government should ndt have waited until the buildings in question 
were under construction before bringing this suit. . . . "). 
388 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
389 See Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37,39 (1975); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 
191 S.E. 368, 370-71 (W. Va. 1937); Note, supra note 144, at 1079. 
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NPS would have standing to bring a public nuisance action, and 
it could sue under either federal common law or Utah Law,390 NPS 
could successfully argue that the proposed Theater will constitute a 
public nuisance because its existence will cause substantial and un-
reasonable harm to Zion and Zion's visitors.391 Because promising 
alternative sites exist where Odyssey could develop the Theater, 
and where the Theater would not constitute a nuisance, a court 
would likely order Odyssey to build at a different location. 392 
A. Application of Federal Common-Law Public Nuisance and 
Utah Public Nuisance Law 
1. The Theater Will Substantially Interfere With Visitors of Zion 
National Park 
a. Federal Common Law 
Odyssey, by building the Theater according to its current plans, 
will substantially interfere with park visitors because the Theater 
will create noises, odors, and commotion that will make ordinary 
visitors of Watchman Campground significantly uncomfortable.393 In 
addition, the Theater will substantially interfere by causing a change 
in life-style for the campers and creating a visual obstruction that 
will offend ordinary visitors. 394 The Theater, seven stories high, 
will be visible from the campground. 395 It will attract thousands of 
viewers with their accompanying cars, car exhaust, noise, litter, and 
general commotion. 396 Although Odyssey has agreed not to operate 
at night, campers trying to enjoy the serene outdoors will surely be 
distracted by the bustle and automobile exhaust during daylight 
hours. Were Odyssey to back out of its agreement to scale back its 
development and operate only during the day, its impact on Zion 
would be even greater. 
390 See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 139-40; Squillace, supra note 9, at 89-90; supra 
notes 123-41, 245 and accompanying text. 
391 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
392 See, e.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 417-18 (Del. Cir. 1905) (defendant wrongly 
built factory in locality not accustomed to its odors); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 
1037, 1041-42 (Utah 1950). 
393 See infra notes 402-05 and accompanying text. 
394 See infra notes 397-400 and accompanying text. 
395 See Wiese Interview I, supra note 67; see also Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
396 See Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9; Williams, supra note 21, at 16; Wiese Interview II, 
supra note 72. 
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Today's Watchman Campground visitors seek a peaceful and nat-
ural environment for camping.397 Known for its gorgeous views of 
daytime horizons and nighttime stars, Watchman attracts campers 
who want to enjoy nature, live outdoors, and escape from their lives' 
normal routines. 398 A court should recognize that citizens suffer sub-
stantial interference when they must change their life-styles as a 
result of someone's interference with their property.399 The Theater 
will cause substantial interference by detracting from the quality of 
the campers' experience and compelling them to travel elsewhere. 400 
Similar to the workers in United States v. Luce,401 who were nearly 
driven out of their workplace by a fish factory's odors,402 and the 
plaintiffs in Wade v. Fuller,403 who the Wade court implicitly com-
pared to people forced out of their homes, Watchman Campground 
visitors reluctantly might choose to camp elsewhere.404 Campers who 
do not move, undoubtedly will experience the relative discomfort of 
hearing crowds of movie-goers and inhaling the exhaust of additional 
automobiles. Admittedly, being forced out of a campground is less 
injurious than being forced out of a private home. Nonetheless, 
courts should recognize that Zion is a type of vacation home to 
members of the public who wish to visit the park and experience its 
wonders. Moreover, the Park Act, mandating that parks survive for 
future generations, implies that any deterioration of a park environ-
ment is significant. 405 
Odyssey will also cause substantial interference with the public 
because the Theater will obstruct the scenic views from Watchman 
Campground and from the road leading to Watchman and the park's 
south entrance. 406 The building will offend the aesthetic tastes of 
ordinary campers seeking the joy of camping at Watchman.407 Unlike 
397 See Williams, supra note 21, at 16 ("[t]hose drawn to places like Las Vegas and those 
drawn to places like Zion generally are two different sorts"); Wiese Interview I, supra note 
67. 
398 Wiese Interview I, supra note 67; see generally ISE, supra note 19, at 654-57. 
399 See United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 409-11 (Del. Cir. 1905); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 
802, 803-05 (Utah 1961); infra notes 401-05 and accompanying text. 
400 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 803-05. A Supreme Court of Utah decision should be persuasive. 
401 141 F. 385 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
402 See id at 407-08.' 
403 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
404 See id. at 804. 
405 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
406 See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143-44 (E.D. 
Va. 1979); Note, supra note 144, at 1075-76. 
407 See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 143-44; Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. 
Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937). 
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United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County,408 where the court 
found that the defendant's buildings would not offend the ordinary 
park visitor, the Theater will disturb the many campers who go to 
Watchman to enjoy the aesthetic pleasures of viewing the land-
scape.409 Planned for construction directly across from the camp~ 
ground, the Theater will obstruct ordinary campers' views from 
Watchman and from the road approaching Zion.410 
Substantial damage would be even more likely to occur were 
Odyssey to retreat from its promise to scale back the size of the 
development and to limit operations to day-time hours. A larger 
theater, restaurant, and hotel would attract greater numbers of 
patrons who would create more noise, litter, and commotion. Oper-
ating at night, the Theater would disturb campers seeking a quiet 
place in which to sleep or relax. Thus, the Theater would be like the 
outdoor cafe in Wade that interrupted nearby residents' sleep. 411 
Outdoor lighting would impede campers' abilities to see stars-a 
favorite activity at Watchman. 412 Furthermore, the larger buildings 
would have a greater impact on the view of the ordinary camper. 413 
Overall, an enlarged development would cause campers additional 
discomfort and compel more campers to camp elsewhere. 
Although NPS could argue successfully that Odyssey will sub-
stantially interfere with the public, NPS would have more difficulty 
claiming that Odyssey will substantially interfere with NPS by sig-
nificantly damaging Zion. Theater patrons probably will contaminate 
the environment with litter and automobile exhaust, yet they prob-
ably will not cause direct damage to the park land.414 Thus, unlike 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,4l5 where the plaintiff's air pollu-
tion actually damaged crops, the increased pollution from cars is 
unlikely to substantially damage vegetation in Zion.416 Although car 
exhaust or litter blowing into the park conceivably could cause sig-
408 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
409 See id. at 143-44; Barrack, 191 S.E. at 371 (object is visual aesthetic nuisance if it offends 
average member of community). 
410 Wiese Interview I, supra note 67; see Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
411 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 803-05. 
412 Wiese Interview I, supra note 67; see Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 672 
(Utah 1943) (citing Hansen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No.1, 62 Idaho 109 (Idaho 1939)). 
413 See supra notes 406-10 and accompanying text. 
414 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619-20 (1907). 
415 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907). 
416 See id. at 619-20. 
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nificant damage to the park, a court would be unlikely to predict a 
future nuisance because the damage is not inevitable. 417 
b. Utah State Law 
NPS probably would have similar success convincing the Utah 
Supreme Court that Odyssey's Theater will substantially interfere 
with the public under Utah law.418 In addition to Wade v. Fuller,419 
NPS could point to Monroe City v. Arnold420 and argue that Odyssey 
will sUbstantially interfere with park visitors by forcing campers to 
leave Zion. Thus, like the plaintiffs in Monroe who shut their win-
dows at night to prevent the defendants' squealing, malodorous pigs 
from disturbing their sleep, Watchman campers might experience 
enough discomfort to induce them to change their camping habits, 
or camp at different locations. 421 
A Utah court might hesitate before finding that the visual intru-
sion resulting from the construction of the Theater will cause sub-
stantial interference with ordinary campers. Nonetheless, the court 
might look to other jurisdictions and recognize that a structure could 
significantly offend an ordinary camper and, consequently, cause 
substantial interference. 422 More likely, a Utah court would consider 
the visual interference part of a combination of factors that will make 
it difficult for ordinary campers to enjoy the park. 423 
A Utah court probably would find that the harm the Theater will 
inflict on the park property will not, alone, constitute substantial 
interference. 424 Car exhaust from Theater patrons probably will not 
inflict significant damage on the property. Unlike Shaw, where the 
defendant's proposed asphalt plant threatened to cause pollutants to 
accumulate on the plaintiff's property, the exhaust from cars of 
theater patrons probably will not damage park vegetation or NPS 
417 See 58 AM. JUR. 2n Nuisances § 351 (1989). 
418 See Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 321-22 (Utah 1969); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 
802,803-05 (Utah 1961); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1040-42 (Utah 1950); Dahl 
v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P. 269, 270-74 (Utah 1927); see also supra notes 261-72 and 
accompanying text. 
419 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
420 452 P.2d 321 (Utah 1969). 
421 See id. at 321-22; Wade, 365 P.2d at 804; supra notes 262-72 and accompanying text. 
422 See Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va 1937); Note, 
supra note 144, at 1076-79; supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text. 
423 See Wade, 365 P.2d at 804-05; Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 
1943) (court referred to Idaho case where night lighting caused visual intrusion that, along 
with noises, created nuisance). 
424 See Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1950). 
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structures.425 NPS would have to focus its argument on the effect of 
the Theater on the public who utilize the park. 
2. The Theater Will Unreasonably Interfere with Visitors of Zion 
National Park 
a. Federal Common Law 
Under federal common law, Odyssey's Theater will unreasonably 
interfere with the public because the Theater will decrease the en-
vironmental quality of Zion National Park's Watchman Campground 
and the park's south entrance area to a level below that which 
campers reasonably expect. 426 This type of interference has never 
previously existed at Zion. Moreover, Odyssey is capable of building 
a comparable complex in a nearby location that would not harm the 
campground's immediate environment.427 Finally, the severity of the 
Theater's threat outweighs the benefits the Theater will provide to 
Odyssey and members of the public.428 
The Theater, by attracting patrons and traffic, will create a level 
of noise, air pollution, and general commotion that does not currently 
exist at Watchman Campground.429 In addition, the Theater will 
occupy part of what is currently an unobstructed scenic view from 
the campground.430 Thus, as in United States v. Luce,431 where work-
ers suffered unreasonable interference when subjected to fish odors 
that permeated previously fresh air, campers at Watchman Camp-
ground will suffer unreasonable interference because they will be 
exposed to substantial interference unlike any that has previously 
existed. 432 The Theater's bustle and pollution, along with its intrusion 
on a scenic view, will suddenly deteriorate a formerly pristine en-
vironment. 
Also contributing to the unreasonable nature of the Theater's 
interference is Odyssey's unwillingness to construct the Theater in 
a location further away from Zion. Alternative sites exist that would 
425 See id. at 1040. 
426 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1907); United States v. Luce, 
141 F. 385, 407-11 (Del. Cir. 1905); supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. 
427 See Luce, 141 F. at 417; infra notes 433--86 and accompanying text. 
428 See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338-40 (1933); 
Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 619; infra notes 439-40 and accompanying text. 
429 See Luce, 141 F. at 411. 
430 Wiese Interview I, supra note 67. 
431 141 F. 385 (Del. Cir. 1905). 
432 See id. at 407-11; Tennessee Copper, 27 S. Ct. at 619. 
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be less intrusive.433 One such alternative site is within one mile of 
Zion. 434 Thus, Odyssey's actions will be comparable to the defend-
ant's in Luce. 435 There, the defendant factory owner was unreason-
able because he chose to operate in a location that would subject the 
plaintiff's workers and inmates to odors, instead of choosing a lo-
cation more accustomed to industrial odors.436 Odyssey's willingness 
to modify the original plan by reducing the development's size and 
hours of operation strengthens its position, but does not change the 
overall unreasonableness of the interference. 437 Partial mitigation is 
not sufficient where the interference remains unreasonable. 438 
Finally, a court would find Odyssey's interference unreasonable 
because the severity of the Theater's harms will outweigh the ben-
efits the Theater will create. 439 A court should find that the harm to 
park visitors will outweigh the Theater's benefits to Odyssey and 
Theater patrons because Odyssey could create those same benefits 
by building in another 10cation.440 Odyssey could construct the The-
ater at an alternative site and, most likely, still create jobs, make a 
profit, and provide recreation for movie-goers. 
b. Utah State Law 
The Theater would also satisfy the unreasonable interference stan-
dard under Utah law. NPS could base its argument on the same 
factors relied on under federal common law. Thus, NPS could argue 
that Odyssey's type of interference will be new to the region, Od-
433 Reinhold, supra note 55, at 9. 
434 Id. 
435 See Luce, 141 F. at 417. 
436 See id. 
437 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 620 (1907). 
438 See id. (defendants' air pollution would remain unreasonable if new technology failed to 
prevent damage to Georgia land). 
439 See id at 619-20. Implicit in the Tennessee Copper Court's reasoning was the fact that 
the harm to crops caused by pollution from Tennessee industries outweighed any benefit the 
defendant company created. See id. Although the Court dismissed the notion of balancing 
equities to determine appropriate relief, it appeared to weigh the potential harm an injunction 
would have on a region dependent upon the defendant industry. See id. 
440 See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 189 U.S. 334, 338-40 (1933). 
Courts look ahead to the type of relief they would order when determining whether the 
defendant's interference is unreasonable. See id. at 339-40. Thus, the W.S. Dickey Clay Court 
found a nuisance in part because the Court would not have to shut down the defendant's 
sewage operations, but instead could compensate the plaintiff with damages. See id. Perhaps, 
the W.S. Dickey Clay Court would not have found a nuisance had the only possible remedy 
been an order to shut down the sewage system. In a lawsuit against Odyssey, the court could 
safely find Odyssey liable for public nuisance without having to enjoin Odyssey from building 
the Theater. The court could simply bar Odyssey from building at its current site. 
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yssey failed to choose a less harmful location, and the Theater's harm 
will outweigh its benefits.441 
NPS could refer to Wade v. Fuller.442 Like the defendants in Wade, 
whose cafe disturbed a formerly peaceful neighborhood, Odyssey 
will generate a new type of interference with its neighbors. 443 Al-
though visitors to Watchman presently arrive in cars and make noise, 
the Theater will cause an unforeseen increase in the noise and com-
motion that normally exists at the campground among campers. 444 
In addition, NPS could emphasize that the interference will be 
unreasonable because of Odyssey's refusal to build on nearby prop-
erty that would pose less of a threat to Zion. 445 Thus, as in Shaw, 
where the defendant could have operated an asphalt plant in a less 
residential area, a Utah court could find that the Theater's interfer-
ence will be unreasonable because Odyssey could choose a location 
where it could operate successfully without harming the quality of 
Zion's environment. 446 Although Odyssey has agreed to scale down 
its original plans for a larger development, the current plan will still 
substantially interfere with Zion. Thus, by not changing locations, 
Odyssey would compel a court to find the interference unreasona-
ble.447 
3. Injunctive Relief 
Whether NPS were to bring a public nuisance action under federal 
common law or Utah law, NPS would probably win an injunction 
441 See supra notes 303-26 and accompanying text. 
442 365 P.2d 802 (Utah 1961). 
443 See id. at 804-05; see also Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enter., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 334-35 
(Utah 1969) (defendant constructed drive-in movie screen adjacent to plaintiff residents). 
444 See Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 804-05 (Utah 1961); Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 
P.2d 217, 218-19 (Utah 1955); Coon v. Utah Constr. Co., 228 P.2d 997, 997-98 (Utah 1951). 
Unlike Coon, where the defendant's conduct was not unreasonable because the defendant's 
trucks, operating on a nearby road, did not noticeably increase the level of noise entering the 
plaintiff's home, the Theater would cause an increased level of noise and commotion, and 
partially occupy a formerly unobstructed view. See Coon, 228 P.2d at 997-98. 
445 See Hatch, 283 P.2d at 220-21; Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah 
1950); supra notes 313-19 and accompanying text. 
446 See Shaw, 224 P.2d at 1042. 
447 See supra notes 313-19 and accompanying text. Odyssey's conduct is distinguishable 
from that of the defendant tar transportation business in Hatch. See Hatch, 283 P.2d at 220-
21. In Hatch, the Supreme Court of Utah found the business' conduct reasonable in part 
because the defendant took measures to create less noise. See id. at 221. The defendant, 
however, was an established small business and was therefore probably less able to change 
locations. See id. at 218-21. Moreover, by repairing roads, the defendant in Hatch was serving 
a vital public interest. See id. 
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ordering Odyssey to build the Theater on an alternative site. The 
court, after finding that the proposed Theater will inevitably create 
a public nuisance,448 would order Odyssey to change locations be-
cause the benefits of preventing the Theater's harm to Zion outweigh 
the harms that such an injunction would inflict on Odyssey and those 
who would gain from the Theater's construction. 449 The benefits of 
the injunction outweigh its harms because Odyssey could develop 
the Theater in a different location without suffering losses from 
having already begun construction at the current site.450 Thus, the 
court could protect Zion without having to take the severe measure 
of shutting down an existing business, or totally preventing Odyssey 
from operating its planned business. Odyssey could still earn profits, 
create jobs, and offer its film to interested patrons. 
The court would probably expect Odyssey to have attempted to 
mitigate potential harm to Zion by picking a less intrusive site. 451 
Like the court in Shaw, which was troubled by the defendant's choice 
of a residential neighborhood as a site for a planned asphalt plant, 
the court would feel justified ordering Odyssey to take available 
action to lessen interference with Zion. 452 
VII. CONCLUSION 
NPS must act aggressively to protect national parks from threat-
ening development projects immediately outside of park bound-
aries. 453 Construction of hotels, retail complexes, and amusement 
centers continues at a rapid pace, contributing to the destruction of 
the natural environment of park boundary areas. 454 NPS should 
overcome its hesitancy to bring public nuisance actions on behalf of 
national parks and park visitors. 
44B See Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n, 142 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1943) (court held it could 
grant injunction as long as it reasonably believed nuisance would be created); 58 AM. JUR. 2D 
Nuisances § 351 (1989). 
449 See, e.g., United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. 
Va. 1979); Wade v. Fuller, 365 P.2d 802, 803-05 (Utah 1961); Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 224 
P.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Utah 1950); supra notes 220, 334 and accompanying text. 
450 Although construction workers have broken ground, they will not begin construction of 
the Theater until springtime, 1993. Wiese Interview III, supra note 72. 
451 See Shaw, 224 P.2d at 1041-42. 
452 See id. at 1041-42; see also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 27 S. Ct. 618, 619-20 
(1907) (although Court did not explicitly balance equities to determine appropriate relief, its 
reasoning implied that it felt justified ordering defendant to take available measures to reduce 
airborne pollutants). 
453 See EVERHART, supra note 1, at 80; RACE, supra note 1, at 7. 
454 See RACE, supra note 1, at 7-12. 
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The federal government has the power to bring public nuisance 
actions to protect national parks under either federal common law 
or state law. 455 Public nuisance provides NPS with an important 
legal tool. Courts consider public nuisance an appropriate avenue 
through which the government can seek injunctions on behalf of 
members of the public whose rights are endangered by a nuisance. 
Where a development impedes citizens' ability to enjoy a natural and 
peaceful park environment, NPS should seek an injunction on behalf 
of present and future park visitors. By taking advantage of the public 
nuisance option, NPS can fulfill its responsibility to the public. 456 
Zion National Park's Theater problem demonstrates the potential 
utility of public nuisance actions. NPS could protect Zion and its 
visitors by bringing a public nuisance action to prevent Odyssey's 
construction of a giant theater complex next to Zion's Watchman 
Campground. Under either federal common law or Utah law, a court 
is likely to agree with NPS that Odyssey, by choosing a site imme-
diately next to a popular park entrance and campground, will sub-
stantially and unreasonably interfere with Zion's visitors.457 Public 
nuisance law, balancing the interests of opposing litigants and com-
munity members, would enable a court to order Odyssey to pick a 
less intrusive site where Odyssey's development could still suc-
ceed.458 NPS, by using public nuisance law, could successfully ad-
dress one of the troubled national park system's most invidious 
problems: developments that threaten boundary areas at Zion and 
numerous other parks. 
455 See supra notes 123-41 and accompanying text. 
456 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
457 See supra notes 393-447 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra notes 448-52 and accompanying text. 
